Page:Cassell's Illustrated History of England vol 8.djvu/164

150 CASSELL'S ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF ENGLAND. [Victoria. not to side with Russia; the latter were engaged to promote a peaceful settlement, and to take other measures if their efforts failed. "It is from England and France alone," wrote Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford on the 28th of July, "that Turkey can look for active sympathy and support; in the event of a struggle, all the other Powers would be found neutral, or would become hostile." France and England, he continued, did not go to war at that moment because they had any doubt that the policy of Russia had been unjust and ungenerous, and was indefensible; but because war would be an additional danger to Turkey; and, he might have added, because neither England, France, nor Turkey were then prepared for war. But they were not the less determined to resist Russia. For the Foreign Secretary finished his despatch with words not only showing that determination, but showing that England and France were allies. "In the event," he said, "of any further aggression by Russia, or of undue delay on her part in accepting the terms of an amicable arrangement that may be proposed to her, Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of France, will be prepared to take more active measures for the protection of Turkey against a Power of whose hostile designs there exists no reasonable doubt." Thus, at this middle stage of the business, England and France were committed to make good their policy by war. Nor were these views kept secret. A little later, Lord Palmerston, in reply to a pro-Russian speech from Mr. Cobden, expressed them in the House of Commons, with not less explicitness and with more energy than Lord Clarendon. And it was therefore with reason, and unhappily with reason, that in the Queen's speech the French Emperor was mentioned by name as in league with Her Majesty, while the other Powers were vaguely spoken of as allies. This distinction was strictly in accordance with facts, for although Austria and Prussia were allies of England in a general sense, in this special sense, and for this special purpose, they were not allies. England had no ally, not one, except the French Emperor. Thus much is due to truth. Louis Napoleon had his own peculiar motives, doubtless, for arraying himself on our side with such eagerness; but the theory of a distinguished historian, that he prevented others from doing so, and drew us away from them at this early stage, obtaining by some compact, "hidden in the folds of private notes," special mention, will not bear the test of facts.

In the meantime projects of conciliation had not been wanting. The idea of a Conference at Vienna occurred to several persons at once. Lord Clarendon started a scheme, based on the project of a Convention between Russia and Turkey, which he drew up. M. Drouyn de Lhuys framed a note to be signed by Turkey, and accepted by Russia. There was Count Buol's project of a fusion of Russian and Turkish ideas. Independently of all this, the representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople got up a scheme of their own, which proved to be distasteful to everybody but the Turks. Peace projectors abounded, while Russia steadily went on with her design, occupied the Principalities in a military fashion, seized on the post-office, intercepted the Sultan's tribute, sent gunboats up the Danube, and when the Porte recalled the Hospodars, induced them to disobey the Sultan's mandate, and forced him to dismiss them. Nor did Russia stop here. She sent emissaries into Servia and Bulgaria; she scattered her manifesto broadcast; she strove to raise a spirit of disaffection; and she replied with haughtiness to the complaints of the Western Powers. In the dominions of the Sultan a corresponding spirit arose. The Czar's manifesto had been read in all his churches; the Ulemas answered by sermons calculated to raise a spirit of counter-fanaticism. It was manifest that Turkish ardour was not extinct. Lord Stratford began to fear more from the rashness than the timidity of the Divan. Military and naval preparations went on briskly, and by the middle of August the Sultan had the satisfaction of knowing that he could defend Shumla, the Balkan, and the Bosphorus, if pressed by the Czar. Lord Stratford did not fail to lay before his Government the real issues at stake, nor did he disguise his doubts of the possibility of coming to a settlement without a resort to war.

It was under these circumstances that Count Buol exerted himself at Vienna to frame a plan of conciliation. He took the draft of a note drawn up by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and by the aid of the representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, and after frequent communication with London and Paris, he constructed out of this draft a note which he hoped would prove acceptable alike to Russia and Turkey. The design was to ascertain whether the Czar would accept the note, and if he agreed to do so, to send it to Constantinople, accompanied by urgent recommendations from the Four Powers to the Porte advising its acceptance. In taking this course, Austria acted as mediator at the request, or at least with the assent, of Russia; but the Russian Ambassador at Vienna would not attend the Conference, and his master was only represented there by a sort of friend. After great labour the note was framed, and a copy sent to St. Petersburg. The Powers took steps immediately to ascertain whether the Czar would accept the note, and they found that, although it did not give him satisfaction, he was content to accept it in a spirit of conciliation, as an arrangement devised by a friendly Government; and he was willing to take it from the hands of a Turkish Ambassador, provided it were not altered in any way. This was the famous "Vienna Note" which attracted so much attention, and raised so many hopes in the summer of 1853. But while Austria and the other Powers had consulted Russia and learned her views, they had forgotten Turkey, for whose benefit the thing was supposed to be devised. They had not ascertained whether Turkey would or could sign it, and, indeed, in framing it, the Powers seemed more anxious to devise a form of words satisfactory to the Czar than safe in the eyes of the Sultan. And so, when it reached Constantinople, although backed by strong advices from all the Powers, and not least by England, the Porte declined to sign it, except in an amended form. The note, indeed, was found to confer rights on Russia