Page:Cassell's Illustrated History of England vol 4.djvu/137

A.D. 1698.] dare not trust in or who willingly desert the solid principles of equity, in a worse condition after their crooked schemes than before. If William had refused to sanction Louis's lawless plans, and given fair notice to the emperor and the other states to be on the watch to defend their rights, it would then have been their own fault if they had not done it. At all events, he would have stood erect in his unsullied fame, and the wily Louis would have borne all the odium alone. If the continent had come, as come it must, to a struggle, it would then have been the honourable part of England to protest against the iniquitous attempts of France; to assist the struggling nations as a great maritime power could and ought to assist them. As it was, Louis succeeded in making William an accomplice to his pretended design of a base partition of a Spanish monarchy; thus destroyed his moral power, and then, deriding his dupe, marched forward towards his real purpose.

When William quitted England after the dissolution of parliament, it was only the more unobservedly to complete this extraordinary business. Tallard followed him to Loo, and they were soon after joined by Portland. It was now about the middle of August, and William wrote to Somers, desiring him to send him full powers under the great seal to complete the negotiation, leaving the names in blanks. He said he had ordered Portland to write to Vernon, the secretary of state, to draw out the commission with his own hand, so that no creature should know anything of it except Somers and one or two of the other most trusted ministers. He told Somers that it was confidently believed that the king of Spain could not outlive the month of October—might die much sooner, and, therefore, not a moment was to be lost.

In consequence of this communication, Somers, who was seeking health at Tunbridge Wells, immediately called into his counsels Russell, now lord Orford, Montague, and Shrewsbury. He informed William that Montague and secretary Vernon had come down to him at Tunbridge; they had seriously discussed this very momentous question, and that it seemed to them that it might be attended with very many ill consequences if the French did not act a sincere part; that the people of England would undoubtedly resent being drawn into any fresh war; and that it required deep consideration what would be the condition of Europe should this proposed partition be carried out. To them it seemed that, if Sicily were in French hands, they would become entire masters of the Levant trade; that if they obtained Ferrol and the other Spanish ports on that coast, Milan would be so entirely shut in from independent intercourse or commerce by sea and land, that it would be utterly powerless; that if France had Guipuzcoa and the other Spanish places on the French side of the Pyrenees, the rest of Spain would be as completely open to French invasion as Catalonia now was; and, finally, if this negotiation was concluded, what security had William for the king of France's faithful execution of it? Were England and Holland to sit still and see France enforce this partition? "If that be so," says Somers, "what security ought we to expect from the French that, while we are neuter, they will confine themselves to the terms of the treaty, and not attempt to take further advantages?"

These considerations, apart from the moral ones, ought to have made William pause. In obedience to the king's orders, Somers sent the carte blanche with the great seal affixed; but he had failed in inducing Vernon to give him a warrant for affixing the seal. The secretary was too well aware of the unconstitutional character of this proceeding to issue such a warrant, and Somers was obliged to content himself with keeping the king's letter as his authority for the act. Undeterred by the plain suggestions of Somers and the other ministers as to the total want of security which William had for Louis's observance of this treaty, and the dangerous power it conferred on France, William was in such haste to conclude the treaty, that the earl of Portland and Sir Joseph Williamson had signed a rough draught before Somers's carte blanche arrived; and on the 11th of October, or about six weeks after its receipt, the formal treaty was signed by Portland, Williamson, Tallard, and Heinsius.

By the eighth article of the treaty, the parties bound themselves, immediately after the ratification of it, to communicate its contents to the emperor and the elector of Bavaria. If they objected to acquiesce in it, their share of the territories were to remain in sequestration till they did; and if they attempted by force to possess themselves of any other than the portions of territory conceded to them the contracting parties bound themselves to oppose this force by all their power: that the elector of Bavaria was to be administrator of Milan till his son was of age; but, in case this was refused, and the state sequestrated, the prince de Vaudemont should be made governor of the state, and in case of his death, the prince Charles de Vaudemont, his son. All princes, kings, and states might become parties to the treaty if they chose.

Here, under the plea of preventing war, was certainly concocted a scheme as pregnant with war as history gives example of. The emperor was certain not to give up his son's right to Spain and all its dependencies in exchange for the insignificant fragment of Milan, and that under the power of France. The moment such a partition was attempted, the emperor and all his adherents would have been in arms. But no such partition was now contemplated by Louis; he was aiming at the whole. All this time that he was amusing William with this treaty, and prostrating his moral character and, therefore, his moral strength, he was busily at work in Spain to induce the dying and imbecile king to bequeath the Spanish monarchy and all its dependencies to him by will. The marquis D'Harcourt, his ambassador at Madrid, was instructed to compass the attainment of the will by all his skill and powers of bribery. He was to obtain the crown for one of the dauphin's sons, or, in any case, to prevent its going to the emperor. To support him in these endeavours, an army of sixty thousand men were advanced to the frontiers of Catalonia and Navarre, and the coasts and ports of Spain were occupied by French men-of-war. Harcourt immediately set about to make a party for this purpose. He represented to this party that Philip IV. had no power to dispose of the crown in the manner in which he had done; that it was contrary to the constitution of the realm; that by the regular order of succession it would go to the children of his daughter, and not to more distant relations; that in case the Spaniards