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, and (2) whether the work is published or unpublished, with the scope for fair use involving unpublished works being considerably narrower.’ ” Blanch, 467 F.3d at 256 (quoting 2 Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright, § 15:52 (2006)).

Here, there is no dispute that Cariou’s work is creative and published. Accordingly, this factor weighs against a fair use determination. However, just as with the commercial character of Prince’s work, this factor “may be of limited usefulness where,” as here, “the creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose.” Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir.2006).

The final factor that we consider in our fair use inquiry is “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.” 17. U.S.C. § 107(3). We ask “whether the quantity and value of the materials used[ ] are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying.” Blanch, 467 F.3d at 257 (quotation marks omitted). In other words, we consider the proportion of the original work used, and not how much of the secondary work comprises the original.

Many of Prince’s works use Cariou’s photographs, in particular the portrait of the dreadlocked Rastafarian at page 118 of Yes Rasta, the Rastafarian on a burro at pages 83 to 84, and the dreadlocked and bearded Rastafarian at page 108, in whole or substantial part. In some works, such as Charlie Company, Prince did not alter the source photograph very much at all. In others, such as Djuana Barnes, Natalie Barney, Renee Vivien and Romaine Brooks take over the Guanahani, the entire source photograph is used but is also heavily obscured and altered to the point that Cariou’s original is barely recognizable. Although “[n]either our court nor any of our sister circuits has ever ruled that the copying of an entire work favors fair use[,] … courts have concluded that such copying does not necessarily weigh against fair use because copying the entirety of a work is sometimes necessary to make a fair use of the image.” Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 613. “[T]he third-factor inquiry must take into account that the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court determined that Prince’s “taking was substantially greater than necessary.” Cariou, 784 F.Supp.2d at 352. We are not clear as to how the district court could arrive at such a conclusion. In any event, the law does not require that the secondary artist may take no more than is necessary. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588, 114 S.Ct. 1164; Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 114. We consider not only the quantity of the materials taken but also “their quality and importance” to the original work. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587, 114 S.Ct. 1164. The secondary use “must be [permitted] to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of the original” to fulfill its transformative purpose. Id. at 588, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (emphasis added); Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 114. Prince used key portions of certain of Cariou’s photographs. In doing that, however, we determine that in twenty-five of his artworks, Prince transformed those photographs into something new and different and, as a result, this factor weighs heavily in Prince’s favor.

As indicated above, there are five artworks that, upon our review, present closer questions. Specifically, Graduation, Meditation, Canal Zone (2008), Canal Zone (2007), and Charlie Company do not sufficiently differ from the photographs of Cariou’s that they incorporate for us confidently to make a determination about their