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 delve deeply enough into the backgrounds of Al-Bayoumi and Al-Thumairy. CS-5 stated that during his/her tenure at the FBI, he/she read a teletype outlining the bureau’s investigation into Bayoumi and was therefore familiar with the investigation into Al-Bayoumi’s activities.

CS-5 stated that a key planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks took place in Malaysia sometime in early 2000. CS-5 stated that a U.S. intelligence agency learned about the meeting by conducting a wiretap on a telephone on belonging to an Al-Qaeda safe house in Yemen. CS-5 recalled that an FBI agent had given the number to the CIA and other intelligence agencies following an interview conducted in the late 1990s with an Al-Qaeda operative who was cooperating with U.S. authorities following the operative’s arrest in East Africa. According to CS-5, it was not possible for the CIA to place a clandestine listening device in the meeting. As a result, the CIA could only direct Malaysian authorities to conduct physical surveillance of the meeting.

CS-5 stated that the CIA did learn, however, that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had multiple entry visas that allowed them to travel to the United States. CS-5 recalled that this information was not passed to the FBI. CS-S stated that it was his/her belief that the information was not passed to the FBI as the CIA was running a “long term intelligence operation” to penetrate Al-Qaeda. CS-5 recalled that CIA officials claimed that they had sent information regarding the two hijackers to FBI HQS via courier. However, an investigation by the 9/11 Commission showed that no information was sent by the CIA to the FBI regarding the Malaysia meeting and the multiple entry visas obtained by Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar.

CS-5 stated that the FBI conducted an “after action” investigation into the events leading up to 9/11. According to CS-5 the investigation was conducted by a special agent assigned to the Washington Field Office for officials at FBI HQS. CS-5 told me that he/she was “astounded” by the 9/11 Commission report as the Commission did not conduct a thorough investigation of Usama Bin Ladin’s associates.

CS-S stated that his/her colleague, a former FBI Special Agent whose identity is known to me, has knowledge of the Saudi connection to 9/11. In addition, CS-5 identified a former FBI Analyst, whose identity is known to me, as having information regarding the events leading up to 9/11. According to CS-5, the analyst was prevented by the CIA from giving critical intelligence information to the FBI. CS-5 stated that had the information about the two San Diego hijackers been given to the FBI Special Agents, it is possible that the 9/11 attacks would have been disrupted.

CS-5 told me that he/she was aware of an electronic communication (EC) to the analyst from a Special Agent assigned to the New York Field Office. The Special Agent’s identity is known to me. According to CS-5, the EC was sent in the weeks prior to the 9/11 attacks. The EC stated that, unless the analyst was able to release the information to the Special Agent, “someone is going to die.” CS-5 stated that the Special Agent was so adamant that he/she be provided