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 from an Al-Qaeda suspect that a “hard line” phone located in a house in Yemen was being used as a communications switchboard by the organization. CS-3 recalled that the existence of the phone number was never exploited by the FBI. However, according to CS-3, agencies of the U.S. intelligence community were able to determine that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were traveling to Malaysia for the meeting.

CS-3 stated that sometime during June of 2001, the CIA approached the FBI’s counter terrorism squad in the New York Field Office and asked for a meeting regarding the Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. CS-3 told me that the CIA had lost track of the two terrorists and were asking for the FBI’s help in locating these two subjects. CS-3 recalled that he/she was excluded from this meeting in New York by CIA’s deputy UBL station chief, herein referred to under the cryptonym HHH. CS-3 told me that had he/she been present at the meeting, he/she would have told the FBI agents assigned to the counter terrorism squad that the two suspected terrorists were of record in indices with the CIA since 2000; and CS-3 would have further explained Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar’s role in the terrorist summit in Malaysia in January of 2000.

CS-3 stated that sometime after the events of 9/11, he/she was in a staff meeting with several high level FBI and CIA officials regarding terrorism. CS-3 stated that he/she overheard one senior CIA official, Director of Operations James Pavitt, telling CIA Director George Tenet that he was glad we kept CIA analyst VVV from 9/11 Commission investigators.

CS-3 recalled that Tenet acknowledged Pavitt’s statement and confirmed that keeping VVV from the 9/11 Commission was a good idea. CS-3 stated that the conversation indicated that two CIA officials had conspired to obstruct the 9-11 Commission by keeping VVV hidden from 9/11 commission officials. CS-3 stated that CIA officials claimed to 9/11 Commission officials that VVV was serving in Italy, but in reality he/she was in Afghanistan.

CS-3 stated that he/she believes that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar obtained their visas to enter the United States at the American Consulate in Jeddah. According to CS-3, the visas were issued to facilitate the operation run by the Saudi’s GID and the CIA team at UBL station.

CS-3 stated that Omar Al-Bayoumi was under investigation by the FBI prior to 9/11.

In August of 2016, I interviewed a former FBI Special Agent, whose identity is known to me. The agent is herein referred to as CS-5. CS-5 told me that prior to 9/11, he/she was assigned to terrorism matters. CS-5 told me that the New York Field Office was responsible for investigations linked to Usama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. CS-5 recalled that he/she was familiar with the names Omar Al-Bayoumi and Fahad Al-Thumairy. CS-5 stated that the two individuals mentioned above were the subject of an FBI investigation centered in San Diego, CA.

According to CS-5, Al-Bayoumi had contact with San Diego based 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. In addition, CS-5 recalled that the 9/11 Commission’s investigation into the alleged Saudi connection into the hijackers was flawed in that it did not