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 CS-3 recalled that shortly after the 9/11 attacks, he/she approached one of his/her supervisors, an FBI Special Agent whose identity is known to me, and told him/her about the existence of the CIR. CS-3 stated that his/her supervisor asked him/her if he/she was sure that the CIR had been drafted. CS-3 stated that he/she left his/her supervisor’s office and returned with a draft of the CIR that he/she had obtained from another FBI agent at UBL Station. According to CS-3, the supervisor read the draft CIR and immediately called a counter terrorism official at FBI headquarters with news of the CIR’s existence. According to CS-3, his/her supervisor then quickly drove to HQS with the draft CIR to meet the official in the parking lot of the Hoover Building to give him a copy of the CIR. CS-3 stated that he/she was unsure what happened to the draft CIR after it was given to the HQS official.

Sometime after he/she was interviewed by the CIA’s Inspector General, CS-3 was questioned by investigators from the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). CS-3 stated that he/she told OPR investigators about the existence of the CIR and how CIA officials had ordered him/her not to distribute the document to the FBI.

CS-3 stated that he/she believed at the time that the CIA prevented the distribution of the CIR as the agency did not want the FBI interfering with a CIA operation that was being run domestically in violation of U.S. law. CS-3 explained that two suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists were living in San Diego, CA during 2000. CS-3 stated that Omar Al-Bayoumi was working for the Saudi Intelligence service when he approached Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar in San Diego. According to CS-3, Al-Bayoumi set up bank accounts and rented an apartment for the two hijackers in the San Diego area. CS-3 stated that this was done at the behest of the CIA through the Saudi intelligence service. According to CS-3, prior to the 9/11 attacks, the CIA was under pressure to recruit informants within Al-Qaeda. Responding to this pressure, VVV and his/her colleagues at the CIA were attempting the recruit Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar via a liaison relationship with the Saudi GID.

CS-3 further explained that the operation was being run by CIA analysts rather than case officers. CS-3 stated that normally, officers trained in covert operations ran human sources at the CIA. However, in the case of the two hijackers living in San Diego, CS-3 told me that a team of analysts ran the operation inside the United States.

CS-3 stated that had the FBI been informed about the possible presence of the two Al-Qaeda operatives in the United States, the investigation would have ultimately been turned over to the New York field office sometime in 2000 for further action and possible disruption of the 9/11 plot. CS-3 further explained that FBI agents in the field would have most likely targeted following Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar with electronic and physical surveillance during the course of a terrorism investigation.

According to CS-3, the FBI had an interest in Al-Qaeda for a number of years prior to the 9/11 attacks. In 1998, for example, an FBI Special Agent, whose identity is known to me, learned