Page:Canestraro Declaration (2021).pdf/4

 CS-3 recalled that from January of 1999 until May of 2003, he/she was assigned as an FBI Special Agent to the CIA Station that handled all matters concerning Usama Bin Laden, herein referred to as UBL Station. CS-3 stated that sometime in 2000, while he/she was assigned to UBL Station, he/she and another FBI agent became aware that two suspected terrorists, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, had multiple entry visas to enter the United States. CS-3 stated that the two hijackers ultimately made their way to the United States and that prior to entering the U.S., the CIA had tracked the above individuals to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. CS-3 stated that the two hijackers attended what CS-3 described as a high level meeting with members of Al-Qaeda. According to CS-3, after the meeting, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar then traveled to the U.S. via Bangkok, Thailand.

CS-3 stated that his/her FBI colleague at UBL Station, whose identity is known to me, prepared a Central Intelligence Report (CIR) outlining the possible presence of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar in the United States. CS-3 stated that after the CIR was prepared, he/she attempted to send it to the FBI, where it would eventually be forwarded to agents for action. CS-3 recalled that a CIA analyst, whose identity is known to me and is herein referred to under the cryptonym VVV, told him/her that, per the Deputy Head of UBL Station, he/she was not to distribute the CIR to anyone outside of UBL Station. CS-3 related that he/she passed this information to his/her FBI counterpart at UBL Station, and, as a result, the CIR was not sent. Later, in the course of an inquiry into the events prior to 9/11, VVV claimed that he/she had passed the information regarding the two suspected terrorists to FBI. However, according to CS-3, FBI records show that VVV never visited FBI HQS as she claimed to pass the information to agents. CS-3 stated that a search of the FBI files also showed no record of the CIR. However, according to CS-3, the document was located by CIA officials in their computer system sometime after 9/11 during an Inspector General’s investigation into the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks. According to CS-3, the CIA IG also obtained copies of instant messages from the deputy head of the UBL station to unnamed persons that corroborate CS-3’s account of the events leading up to 9/11.

CS-3 stated that he/she was interviewed about the events prior to the 9/11 hijackings sometime in 2002 by representatives of the Joint Congressional Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks. CS-3 stated that before he/she and his/her FBI collogue were interviewed, he/she was told by CIA officials at UBL station not to cooperate fully with Congressional investigators. CS-3 stated that the justification the CIA used for the above was that the investigators were looking to “hang someone” for the events of 9/11. CS-3 also stated that CIA personnel told him/her that Congressional officials were not cleared for access to information regarding activities at UBL station. According to CS-3, the CIA had an officer in the room while he/she was being interviewed by the Congressional investigators. CS-3 stated that he/she never mentioned the order not to distribute the CIR to Congressional investigators. CS-3 stated that when he/she was questioned by the CIA’s own Inspector General about the events prior to 9/11, he/she did not mention the CIR as he/she had no lawyer present and was concerned with the legal ramifications of the CIR not being passed to FBI.