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 the 9-11 attacks, it became impossible for the FBI to unilaterally conduct a terrorism or counter intelligence investigation without the tacit approval of the CIA. CS-22 further related that officers of the local CIA domestic station located in his/her office of assignment would frequently sit in the command centers of local FBI Field Offices while FBI agents conducted operations related to counter terrorism to monitor FBI activities. CS-22 told me that the above made it easy for CIA officers to monitor FBI activities in counter terror and counter intelligence investigations.

CS-22 told me that he/she became aware of an investigation conducted by a private individual into the activities of a former FBI informant whom I later determined through investigation to be Abdussattar Shaikh. CS-22 told me that the investigation by the private individual was conducted sometime after the 9-11 attacks. I checked open source information and learned that Shaikh was employed by the FBI as a confidential source concerning terrorism matters prior to 9-11. CS-22 related to me that the post-9/11 investigation into Shaikh’s activities showed that he was receiving funds from the Saudi Arabian government while he was serving as an informant for the FBI. CS-22 further stated that the investigation also indicated that prominent Saudi Citizens would stay at Shaikh’s boarding house while visiting California. CS-22 told me that the investigation revealed that the Saudi Arabian government was using Shaikh to monitor the activities of its citizens while they were abroad. A review of open source documents that conducted by your declarant shows that Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar rented a room from Shaikh during the Spring of 2000.

During June of 2021, I interviewed a Confidential Source, herein referred to as CS-23. CS-23’s identity is known to me. CS-23 is a former FBI Special Agent with extensive knowledge of counter terrorism and counter intelligence matters, CS-23 is familiar with FBI investigations into the 9/11 attacks. CS-23 stated that the FBI conducted a counter intelligence investigation into the activities of Omar Al-Bayoumi prior to 9/11 as FBI officials in the San Diego Field Office suspected that he was operating as an intelligence officer. CS-23 told me that as a matter of routine, FBI officials contacted CIA HQS for indices checks on Al-Bayoumi to support their investigation. CS-23 told me that CIA officials responded to the San Diego field office and reported that the CIA held no files on Al-Bayoumi. CS-23 told me that the above represented a falsehood. CS-23 stated that the CIA maintained “operational” files on Omar Al-Bayoumi. CS-23 explained to me that “operational” files are those files related to an intelligence operation conducted by a given agency. CS-23 further explained that he/she was aware of a CIA “paper trail” concerning Al-Bayoumi.

CS-23 told me that information concerning Al-Bayoumi was never passed to the FBI. CS-23 told me that Al-Bayoumi was an intelligence officer in employ of the Saudi Government. CS-23 stated that Omar Al-Bayoumi was directed to attempt to recruit Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar as intelligence sources while they were in San Diego. CS-23 stated that Al-Bayoumi was instructed to recruit the two hijackers at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angles by Fahad