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 not speak the source’s native language. CS-14 stated that he/she contacted the CIA for assistance with the source. The CIA agreed to provide assistance to CS-14. As a result, a CIA case officer was always present when CS-14 would meet with the SOI for intelligence debriefings.

CS-14 stated that during one of the above debriefings, his/her CIA counterpart showed CW1 a series of photographs. CS-14 stated that the CIA case officer did not tell him/her the origin of the photos. CS-14 stated that he/she also did not know the names of the suspects in the photos. As he/she did not speak CW1’s language, CS-14 was unaware that, during the debriefing, CW1 had been shown surveillance photographs of a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia between members of Al-Qaeda. According to CS-14, he/she learned after the 9/11 attacks that CW1 had recognized Walid Bin Attash in the same surveillance photographs as Nawaf Al-Hazmi. CS-14 further explained that CW1 had noticed Bin Attash in the background in one of the surveillance photos of the two hijackers and this information linked the two hijackers to Bin Attash. CS-14 stated that he/she was never shown the full report that the CIA case officer had prepared following the debriefing. CS-14 stated that the information regarding the photo identification was never passed to FBI field offices that had Bin Attash under investigation for his role in the bombing of the USS Cole.

CS-14 stated that he/she gave a statement to the 9/11 Commission regarding CW1’s debriefings after the 9/11 attacks. CS-14 recalled that the CIA officer assigned to handle CW1 corroborated CS-14’s statement. CS-14 explained that the CIA case officer told investigators that CS-14 never was privy to the photo identification by CW1. CS-14 stated that he/she later learned that a CIA analyst assigned to UBL station had prevented the FBI from getting complete information regarding the surveillance operation in Malaysia. As a result, FBI agents in the New York Field Office were unaware that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had visas to enter the United States.

CS-14 stated that following the 9/11 attacks, former FBI Director Mueller took “100%” of the blame for intelligence failures that took place before the 9/11 attacks. CS-14 told me that this assessment was not accurate. For example, CS-14 explained to me that former CIA Director George Tenet misspoke when he described CS-14’s knowledge of the photographs viewed by the CW1. CS-14 stated that Tenet told the 9/11 Commission that CS-14 was told by the CIA before the 9/11 attacks that CW1 had identified Bin Attash in a series of surveillance photographs taken during the meeting in Malaysia as referenced above. CS-14 reiterated that he/she was never given this information before the 9/11 attacks.

In June of 2021, I re-interviewed CS-14. CS-14 told me that the CIA officer who had been assisting him/her in handling CW1 had suggested to CIA officials that he/she be given access to the complete CIA file regarding CW1’s cooperation. CS-14 stated that this file would have included detailed reporting regarding CW1’s identification of individuals in the surveillance photographs referenced above. CS-14 told me that his/her access to the file on CW1 was blocked by the CIA’s liaison officer at FBI HQS. The identity of the CIA official referenced above is the same officer identified earlier in this declaration under the cryptonym HHH. HHH