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 CS-12 told me that he/she continued to press FBI Headquarters for further information regarding the subjects in the photographs later in the summer of 2001. CS-12 recalled that sometime during the day on August 23, 2001 he/she opened an electronic communication, known in the FBI as an EC, from HQS concerning the subjects of the photographs, CS-12 recalled that the EC contained information showing that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were in the United States. CS-12 stated that he/she then contacted the FBI analyst regarding the EC. CS-12 recalls that the conversation between him/her and the analyst became “heated” when the analyst told CS-12 that he/she was not authorized to view the EC and that he/she was ordered to delete it immediately. CS-12 stated that the analyst told him/her that the information contained in the EC was obtained from intelligence sources and, as a result, the “wall” rule applied; i.e. only agents who were designated as intelligence agents could see the information.

CS-12 related that on or about August 24, 2001 he/she participated in a conference call with the analyst and the Special Agent who was the acting Bin Laden Unit Chief at FBI HQS. CS-12 stated that the call lasted approximately 45 minutes. During the call, officials at FBI Headquarters told CS-12 to “stand down” and to cease looking for Khalid Al-Mihdhar. CS-12 explained that HQS officials told him/her that they were seeking to open an intelligence gathering investigation on Al-Mihdhar. As CS-12 was assigned to a criminal rather than intelligence billet at the New York office, he/she was not authorized to pursue the case against Al-Mihdhar. CS-12 stated that he/she emailed the analyst the next day regarding the conference call. In the email, CS-12 told the analyst that “someone is going to die” unless the case against Al-Mihdhar was pursued further.

CS-12 stated that immediately following the attacks of 9/11, he/she and other New York based FBI agents participated in a second conference call with FBI Headquarters. It was during this call that CS-12 learned that Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi were on the flight manifests of one of the planes that were used in the attacks. CS-12 recalls that the conference call then became quite heated between New York agents and HQS personnel. CS-12 stated that one of the analysts assigned to the FBI New York Field Office ran the two hijackers against commercial databases. CS-12 told me that the analyst quickly found that the two hijackers had addresses in San Diego.

CS-12 told me that on or about September 14, 2001, he/she contacted the FBI analyst regarding information on the hijackers involved in the attacks, CS-12 stated that the analyst subsequently provided him/her with a fourth surveillance photograph from the same surveillance operation that was referenced above. CS-12 stated that Walid Bin Attash was depicted in this fourth photograph. CS-12 stated that this was the first time he/she had seen the photograph of Bin Attash in this context. CS-12 recalled that he/she asked the analyst about the photograph and the analyst was unable to provide any details as to why the photo had not been show to agents at the New York meeting. CS-12 noted that the photograph showed Bin Attash in an airport and that he was immediately recognizable due to his missing leg.