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 CS-10 stated that he/she noted during his/her tenure at UBL Station that there was an unusual culture at the station. CS-10 told me that the analysts at UBL Station felt that they could undertake operations as easily as the case officers even though they had not been trained in covert intelligence gathering techniques. CS-10 stated that the analysts were able to successfully block one of his/her operations targeting Al Qaeda.

CS-10 stated that analysts also had some control over the communications that case officers had with CIA field units. CS-10 explained that if a case officer wanted to send a cable to a field station, authorization would have to be obtained from station management. CS-10 stated that he/she recalled that the Station Chief and his/her deputy (herein referred to under the cryptonym HHH) had the authority to release a cable to the field. According to CS-10, HHH was an analyst who had little or no understanding of the duties of CIA case officers.

CS-10 further explained to me the procedure for official communications within the UBL Station. If CS-10 had to write a cable to an operational station in the field, it would be drafted and then he/she would send it either HHH or the Station Chief for approval. Once they approved the message, then the cable would be routed for approval to the various sections within CIA HQS for further approval before the message would ultimately be approved and sent.

During October of 2016, I met with a former CIA case officer, whose identity is known to me and is herein referred as CS-11. CS-11 told me that he/she served in the operations division of the Central Intelligence Agency for approximately six years. CS-11 stated that he/she was assigned to the UBL Station sometime prior to the 9/11 attacks.

CS-11 stated that while he/she was assigned to UBL Station, he/she observed activity that appeared to be outside the normal CIA procedures. CS-11 recalled that one analyst, herein referred to by the cryptonym MMM, controlled operations at the station. CS-11 stated that normally a case officer is responsible for managing operations at a station. CS-11 told me that the analysts at UBL station mostly stuck to themselves and did not interact frequently with other employees at the station.

CS-11 stated that it would have been difficult for MMM to run an operation out of UBL Station without approval from other CIA officers. CS-11 explained that a Chief of Station (COS) would normally not allow MMM to communicate an operational plan via email. Instead, CS-11 explained, a COS would normally require that operational orders be communicated from UBL Station to the COS via a cable.

CS-11 stated that he/she believes that MMM did not have the ability to send cables out of UBL Station on his/her own. CS-11 stated that normal communications traffic at the CIA would be sent from UBL Station to CIA Headquarters. At CIA Headquarters, the cable would be routed to the various sections that handled specific areas of the world for approval. The cable would then be sent to the COS for action. CS-11 recalled that MMM and her team of analysts used their pseudonyms when communicating with members of UBL Station. CS-11 noted that this