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 his/her belief that information was concealed from the FBI by LLL to ensure that O’Neil did not interfere with LLL’s operations.

During October of 2016, I interviewed a former CIA official, whose identity is known to me and is herein referred to as CS-10.

CS-10 told me that he/she served with the Central Intelligence Agency for 25 years. During his/her service with the CIA, CS-10 was assigned as a case officer. CS-10 told me that sometime prior to the 9/11 attacks, he/she was assigned to UBL Station. CS-10 stated that the mission of UBL Station was to collect intelligence regarding Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. CS-10 told me that he/she was brought into the UBL Station by a CIA officer whose identity is known to me. According to CS-10, he/she was one of the few case officers assigned to UBL Station, which, according to CS-10, was staffed primarily by intelligence analysts. CS-10 told me that he/she found this arrangement unusual. CS-10 stated that since the mission of the UBL Station was to gather intelligence, the station should have been staffed by case officers as the role of a case officer in the CIA was to gather intelligence. CS-10 explained to me that intelligence analysts at the CIA are not trained in intelligence gathering operations.

CS-10 stated that during the time that he/she was assigned to UBL Station, the CIA did not have any human sources inside of Al-Qaeda. CS-10 recalled that there was extensive pressure from CIA management to develop human sources inside of Al-Qaeda.

CS-10 stated that most of the information concerning Al-Qaeda was gleaned from technical collection methods. CS-10 recalled the first chief of UBL Station was LLL. According to CS-10, LLL was an analyst with no experience in operational matters. CS-10 recalled that LLL shared most of the intelligence information concerning Al-Qaeda with MMM and VVV, who were intelligence analysts assigned to the station.

CS-10 recalled that UBL Station was a “virtual” station physically located in the United States. CS-10 stated that this unusual arrangement, along with the choice to staff the station with analysts, made it difficult for the station to accomplish its mission of penetrating Bin Laden’s organization. CS-10 explained that recruiting intelligence sources is normally done by CIA officers stationed in foreign countries. Consequently, it would be nearly impossible for UBL Station to develop informants inside of Al-Qaeda from its base several thousand miles from the countries where Al-Qaeda was suspected of operating.

CS-10 told me that he/she observed other unusual activities at UBL Station during his/her tenure. CS-10 recalled that analysts at UBL Station would direct operations to case officers in the field by sending the officers cables instructing them to do a specific tasking. CS-10 noted that this was a violation of CIA procedures in that analysts normally lacked the authority to direct a case officer to do anything. The actions of the analysts were authorized first by LLL and later supported by his/her replacement.