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 his/her office a few moments later with a draft of the CIR referenced above outlining the information on the two hijackers. CS-4 noted that the cable had been drafted by another FBI agent assigned to UBL Station. CS-4 then asked CS-3 if anyone else knew about the cable. CS-3 told CS-4 that only he/she and another FBI agent knew about the documents. CS-4 told me that he told CS-3 to tell no one else about the cable.

CS-4 recalled that he/she then contacted Pasqual D’Amuro, the FBI’s Deputy Director for Counterterrorism. CS-4 told D’Amuro that he/she needed to meet with him right away. CS-4 then quickly left UBL Station and drove his/her vehicle at high rate of speed down the George Washington Parkway to FBI HQS. At FBI HQS, CS-4 met with D’Amuro. CS-4 recalls that he/she gave the cable to D’Amuro. D’Amuro read the cable and then told CS-4 “I will take care of this.” The meeting then ended. CS-4 then met with CS-3 and told CS-3 “it (meaning the issue with the CIR) has been handled. Don’t say anything about the cable’s existence to anyone.” CS-4 noted that D’Amuro never mentioned the cable’s existence to him/her again during any of their subsequent conversations.

CS-4 stated that a short time after the above incident took place, he/she was promoted from his/her positon at UBL Station to a senior liaison position outside of the FBI. CS-4 stated that he/she did not ask for the promotion. CS-4 told me that he/she felt that he/she was moved from the positonposition [sic] at UBL Station to the position at the center in that he/she knew about the existence of the cable. CS-4 further stated that he/she believes that he/she was moved in order to ensure that he/she kept silent about the cable’s existence.

CS-4 stated that while he/she was assigned to the UBL Station, he/she noted that CIA intelligence analysts rather than case officers seemed to be running the station’s day to day activities. CS-4 stated that he/she found this situation untenable and that he/she ordered FBI personnel assigned to the UBL Station that they were not to take instructions from analysts. CS-4 noted that in a normal operational environment, case officers and sworn law enforcement officers (i.e. FBI Special Agents) give directions to intelligence analysts. In UBL Station, however, this practice was ignored as the analysts occupied all of the top positonspositions [sic] at the station. CS-4 further explained that no communications could leave the station without authorization from the station’s analysts.

CS-4 recalled that analysts had considerable influence on the way in which operations undertaken on behalf of UBL Station were conducted in the field. CS-4 stated that several CIA case officers had told him/her that they were upset with this situation. CS-4 stated that one of the most influential analysts at the station, whose identity is known to me and is herein referred to under the cryptonym MMM, had personality conflicts with FBI agents at the station.

CS-4 stated that one of the chief analysts at UBL Station, herein referred to under the cryptonym LLL, had personality conflicts with FBI Special Agent John O’Neil. CS-4 stated that it was