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 Saudi intelligence and, ultimately to the CIA. Mr. Clarke stated that when he proclaimed this belief publicly, he received an angry call from former director of the CIA George Tenet. Mr. Clarke noted, however, that Mr. Tenet did not deny the allegation made by Mr. Clarke.

Mr. Clarke stated that the 9/11 Commission did not investigate the Saudi connection to the 9/11 attacks completely. Mr. Clarke recalled that the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, was selected by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to prevent damage to the Bush Administration by blocking the Commission’s line of inquiry into the Saudi connection. Mr. Clarke told me that the operation to penetrate Al-Qaeda may have organized by high level employees at the CIA. Mr. Clarke stated that he believed that most of the records of the CIA’s operation to penetrate Al-Qaeda through Al-Bayoumi were destroyed in an effort to cover up the operation.

Mr. Clarke stated that he was first informed that the CIA had known about Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar’s involvement with Al-Qaeda during the late morning hours of the 9/11 attacks. Mr. Clarke stated that while he was on a secure video conference receiving an update on the attacks, he was interrupted by a call from Dale Watson, then Assistant Director of the FBI for Counter Terrorism. Watson told Mr. Clarke that he wanted to pass some important information. Mr. Clarke stated that he stepped outside the conference room into the hallway to take Watson’s call. During the call, Watson told Mr. Clarke that the passenger manifests had been checked for the planes that been involved in the attacks. Watson further told Clarke that the names Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were previously identified as being members of Al-Qaeda and that the FBI was recently told of this by the CIA.

During September of 2016, I interviewed a former FBI Special Agent whose identity is known to me. The special agent is herein referred to as CS-4. CS-4 told me that he/she was assigned as the FBI representative to UBL Station in the spring of 2002. CS-4 noted that during his/her time at UBL station, he/she supervised two other FBI agents.

CS-4 stated that sometime in the spring of 2002, CS-3 approached him/her and said “boss, something is bothering me big time”. CS-3 further explained to CS-4 that “we (meaning the United States Government) could have prevented the 9/11 attacks.” CS-4 recalled that CS-3 then outlined to him the existence of intelligence from the CIA that showed that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had met with other members of Al-Qaeda in Malaysia. CS-3 further explained to CS-4 that the CIA knew in January of 2001 that both hijackers had multiple entry visas to the United States, and their travel plans possibly included a visit to the U.S.

According to CS-4, CS-3 further explained to him/her that another FBI agent had written a cable for distribution to the FBI and other agencies outlining the above information. CS-3 told CS-4 that the cable was not distributed on orders from one of the analysts at UBL Station. CS-4 stated that he/she told CS-3 that although he/she did not doubt his/her recollection of events, he/she was not convinced as “if it is not on paper, it didn’t happen.” CS-4 stated that CS-3 came back into