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 Later in September of 2016, I interviewed a former FBI agent whose identity is known to me. The agent is herein referred to as CS-9. CS-9 told me that he/she was assigned to the Washington Field Office following the 9/11 attacks. CS-9 stated that he/she was part of a squad of FBI agents who were tasked with investigating leads developed following the attacks. CS-9 and his/her task force concentrated on leads in the Washington, DC area. CS-9 stated that agents were told they were not permitted to interview Saudi nationals in support of their investigation. CS-9 stated that many of the leads developed during his/her investigations pointed toward the Saudi diplomats stationed in Washington, DC.

Later in September of 2016, I interviewed Mr. Richard Clarke. Mr. Clarke is a former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Clinton and President George W. Bush. Mr. Clarke recalled that in his role within the National Security Council (NSC) was to coordinate all intelligence related to terrorism and to facilitate the sharing of information between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Mr. Clarke stated that sometime before the 9/11 attacks, he was told by Deputy CIA Director Coffer Black that the CIA did not have any human intelligence sources inside of Al-Qaeda. Mr. Clarke recalled that Black told him that he was resolved to address this situation and penetrate Al-Qaeda with informants. Mr. Clarke stated that he was never informed that the CIA had learned that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar attended a high level Al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia in 2000. Mr. Clarke stated that he later learned that approximately 50 people within the CIA knew that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar attended the Malaysia meeting with other members of Al-Qaeda.

Mr. Clarke stated that he was not informed by the CIA that the two hijackers had multiple entry visas to the United States. Mr. Clarke stated that if he had been given this information, he would have passed it to John O’Neil at the FBI’s New York Field Office for further investigation. Mr. Clarke stated that it was common knowledge among the staff at NSC that he had a close relationship with Special Agent O’Neil and that any information gathered by another agency of interest to the New York Field Division would have been immediately passed by Clarke to O’Neil and the Counter Terrorism Squad. Mr. Clarke told me that he routinely passed CIA information to the FBI and that passing intelligence information between agencies was part of his day to day duties at the NSC. Mr. Clarke told me that the policy of the FBI during 2000 and 2001 was that as soon as a terrorist suspect was identified, the suspect would be promptly arrested by FBI agents. Mr. Clarke stated that the top FBI official in the counter terrorism division, Dale Watson, was also not informed that the CIA knew that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had attended the Al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia.

Mr. Clarke stated that he believes that the reason why the FBI was not informed that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had attended the Al-Qaeda meeting and that the two hijackers had multiple entry visas for the United States was that the CIA was running a “false flag” operation to recruit the hijackers. According to Mr. Clarke, this “false flag” operation would have involved Al-Bayoumi befriending the two hijackers by attempting to convince them that he was sympathetic to their cause. At the same time, Al-Bayoumi would have been reporting on the hijacker’s activities to