Page:Canerday-Banks v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 523.pdf/15

 interest. In re Adoption of K.M., 2015 Ark. App. 448, at 4, 469 S.W.3d 388, 391 (citing Lewis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 347). We will not reverse a circuit court's decision regarding the best interest of a child to be adopted unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, giving due regard to the opportunity and superior position of the circuit court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Adoption of K.M., 2015 Ark. App. 448, at 3, 469 S.W.3d 388, 390. In Newkirk v. Hankins, 2016 Ark. App. 186, 486 S.W.3d 827, we explained:

In cases involving minor children, the trial court must utilize to the fullest extent all its power of perception in evaluating the witnesses, their testimony, and the children's best interest. Because the appellate court has no such opportunity, the superior position, ability, and opportunity of the trial court to observe the parties are afforded their greatest weight in cases involving minor children.

Newkirk, 2015 Ark. App. 186, at 8–9, 486 S.W.3d at 832–33 (internal citations omitted).

We have previously stated that the code grants the circuit court the authority to decide the issue of whether DHS unreasonably withheld its consent to the adoption of a minor in its care and custody. Davis-Lewallen v. Clegg, 2010 Ark. App. 627, at 7, 378 S.W.3d 185, 190 (citing Patterson v. Robbins, 295 Ark. 511, 749 S.W.2d 330 (1988)). In Davis-Lewallen, we stated that "[n]either this court nor the supreme court has provided a test as to what constitutes unreasonable withholding of consent." Id., 378 S.W.3d at 190 (citing Tom v. Cox, 101 Ark. App. 388, 278 S.W.3d 110 (2008)). However, the Tom case, cited in Davis-Lewallen, applied the clearly-erroneous standard. Tom, 101 Ark. App. at 393, 278 S.W.3d at 113 ("The issue at hand in this case is whether the circuit court's finding that Ms. Cox reasonably withheld her consent to the adoption is clearly erroneous."). Tom is therefore our best