Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/668

 636 The Alabama controversy. [i865-7i wisely refrained from threats, and confined himself to a steady diplomatic pressure, confident that his end was more likely to be peacefully attained if he avoided affronting a government resting mainly on military prestige. Napoleon III acted as Seward had foreseen, and, harassed by European complications, withdrew his forces in 1867. As regards relations with Great Britain, the situation was still more threatening. The country, while not anxious for war, cherished feelings of bitter resentment on account of the ravages committed by Confederate cruisers equipped in England, and the unsympathetic attitude of the English governing classes during the war. There were, moreover, unsettled boundary and fisheries controversies, and differences about naturalisation arising from the trial of certain Irish "Fenian" con- spirators claiming American citizenship. At first Earl Russell, in 1865, absolutely denied the possibility of arbitrating on any American claims ; but a year later English opinion altered, and Lord Stanley, Russell's successor, intimated a willingness to discuss the question. Prolonged negotiations as to the extent to which the Alabama claims should be considered led eventually to the drawing up by Lord Clarendon and Reverdy Johnson, United States minister to England, of two protocols and a treaty for arbitration. One of the protocols, regarding naturali- sation, was developed into the treaty of 1870 ; but the other results of Johnson's mission proved fruitless. The disfavour in which the Senate held Seward, together with the popular feeling that something more than a mere claims treaty was necessary, led to the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon draft as inadequate and defective. There followed a period of renewed negotiation between Lord Clarendon and Secretary Fish, much hampered by a speech of Sumner in the Senate, announcing that the United States would accept nothing less than a national apology, together with reparation for indirect damages suffered by the United States through England's recognition of Confederate belligerency. President Grant in his message of 1870 sug- gested that the United States should pay the claims, and thus assume them against Great Britain; but the necessity for any such radical action was avoided by an agreement reached through the skilful dealing of Sir John Rose and Fish in 1871. Both governments joined in appointing a High Commission, which met in Washington, and by a treaty in May, 1871, practically settled all outstanding questions. An expression of courteous regret on the part of the British Commissioners disposed of the claim for an apology; minor matters were dealt with; and three arbitrations were provided, for the fisheries, the North- western boundaries, and the Alabama claims. In the course of the following year the principal issue was laid at rest by the award of the arbitration tribunal, which, after a hearing at Geneva, dismissed the extreme American claims, but held Great Britain guilty of negligence in several cases, and assigned damages of $15,500,000. In this way the skill and persistence