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 1862] Lincoln resolves on emancipation. 589 continual protest that the war ought to be fought without damage to slavery, a theory as impossible as that snow should not melt under a July sun. Indirectly their opposition served one useful purpose. It enabled the President to stand midway between them and the anti- slavery extremists, and to keep legislation and administration within prudent and constitutional limits. Meanwhile the chances of war were carrying the issue towards an acute and dangerous crisis. The inspiring victories gained by the Federal arms during the early months of the year 1862 suddenly ceased; and defeat and disaster seemed to culminate in McClellan's despairing dispatch from the peninsula, expressing the fear that, instead of con- quering Richmond, he was about to lose his army. The President's call for 300,000 volunteers gave momentary relief to the army and hope to the country, but, facing the political as well as the military emergency, he also considered and decided how he would deal with the subject of slavery. On July 12, 1862, Lincoln for the second time called together the representatives and senators from the border Slave States, and read to them a carefully prepared written appeal to accept compensation for slaves in their respective States. " Let the States," said he, " which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their proposed Confederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain the contest. But you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them, so long as you show a deter- mination to perpetuate the institution within your own States.... The incidents of the war cannot be avoided ; if the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion by the mere incidents of war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it." But this appeal, like the former one, proved substantially barren of result. Twenty members signed a written address in reply two days after, reiterating their loyalty, but urging a general plea of non- action to the President's request. Nine others promised to lay the matter before the people of their States. Both the refusal of the majority, and the non-committal attitude of the others indicated clearly enough that the plan had no hope of success. President Lincoln had doubtless foreseen the failure, for on the following day, July 13, 1862, he confided to two members of the Cabinet his determination to issue a decree of military emancipation. During a drive with Secretaries Seward and Welles he introduced the subject, and "dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance and delicacy of the movement ; said he had given it much thought, and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity, absolutely essential for the salvation of the nation, that we must free the slaves, or be ourselves subdued." CH. XVIII.