Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/599

 1861-5] The war against commerce. Its results. 567 1862 to 117,756 tons ; in 1863 to 222,199 tons ; in 1864 to 300,865 tons; and in the first half of 1865 to 133,832 tons. The tonnage of the American deep-sea merchant fleet diminished from 2,496,894 tons in 1861 to 1,387,756 in 1866. The pressure of heavy insurance rates, and the impossibility of obtaining cargo when its delivery was a matter of complete uncertainty, led to this decline. Of the ships which remained on the American register the greater number were laid up in home or neutral ports. Moreover, this trade, once lost, was not recovered; the destruction of the American shipping industry was one of the most permanent effects of the war. For her remissness in permitting the sailing or coaling of the commerce-destroyers Great Britain subsequently paid the sum of ,3,100,000 to the United States ; and, though this amount much more than covered the direct losses, it gave no compensation for the enormous indirect loss which the warfare against commerce had inflicted. The Confederate cruisers were vessels of a type now obsolete, relying mainly upon sails, but with auxiliary steam-power, and had, as we have seen, to deal mainly with sailing ships. They proved extremely difficult to catch, and were almost always able to elude the Northern war-ships. But with no Confederate ports and coaling stations abroad the Confederate cruisers were bound to be driven, sooner or later, into neutral harbours for want of coal ; and then they could only depend on the good-will of neutrals, which was wanting so soon as fortune turned against the Confederacy on land. The measures taken by the Northern government to deal with the commerce-destroyers were defective; yet, as the North was in no sense dependent upon foreign commerce, the government was probably right in refusing to weaken the blockade of the Southern coast by detaching war-ships to prevent the destruction of commerce. The main lesson of the war is the importance of preparation and organisation. This was not, it has been justly said, a naval war, as the South did not possess a navy. " There were three or four cruisers at sea, some of which were captured or destroyed after having obliterated Northern commerce, and one of which at least was never captured. There was an extemporised fleet here and there, made up of anything that came to hand." There was a want of skilled direction and unity of control in the actual operations on the part of the North ; and, though a fleet was at last created by the Federal government, it was only after great delay and enormous and unnecessary waste of money. For their want of forethought the Northern people had to pay a terrible price both in blood and money ; and, if they had had to deal with an adversary better equipped with engineering resources, or if that adversary had been able to obtain the help of a European navy, the Confederacy would probably have survived the conflict. CH. XVII.