Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/583

 1861-5] Effects of the blockade. 551 of the Mississippi valley and the control of the waters of that river and its tributaries by a naval flotilla were the logical extension of the blockade principle, since such action would sunder the eastern States of the Confederacy from the western States and from the only land frontier which touched a neutral power, Mexico. It would also close these rivers to the movements of Southern troops, at the same time opening them to the passage of the Northern armies for the purpose of land operations. Nor was this all. At the date of the out- break of war, direct communication between the centres of population in the Confederacy was still effected in large measure by water. The carriage roads were very rough ; and the railway system was imper- fect, the lines being poorly laid and ill-equipped with rolling-stock. There was railway communication between Richmond, Wilmington, and Charleston ; but between the Atlantic coast and the Mississippi valley there were only two lines that from Richmond through Chattanooga to Memphis, and that from Charleston through Atlanta to Vicksburg. These lines were linked up at three points by lateral branches ; they were only laid with a single pair of rails, and possessed no facilities for working much more than two or three freight trains a day. One of these lines, moreover, was broken early in the war. Thus, though at first the South enjoyed the advantage of interior lines, it lost this advantage with the loss of its rivers, the steady deterioration of its railroads, and the close blockade of its coast. At the same time every single State in the Confederacy was exposed to the attack of combined expeditions ; and the government was in con- sequence compelled by popular clamour to distribute its military force. Any point on the Southern coast or on the navigable rivers might be seized by the North with the help of its overpowering fleet, and made a base for a Northern advance into the interior. Yet this very facility of invasion operated in some degree to the disadvantage of the United States, as it led their government also to scatter its forces in a number of disconnected fields, with no unity of purpose. This mistaken system continued till General Grant attained high command, and brought to bear on the military problem his strategic insight and tenacious will. He found the Union troops scattered and " acting against different and un- important points, spread out so as to cover a wide and disconnected territory, and... in reality doing nothing to accomplish the main objects of the war." He at once directed concentration on the vital points, and by so doing paved the way to final victory. The blockade of the whole Southern coast, with the exception of the littoral of North Carolina and Virginia, was proclaimed on April 19, 1861; and those two States were included a week later. This was an ironical comment upon the contention of the United States in 1812, since, to render the blockade effective, there were at the moment of the proclama- tion, as we have already seen, only three steam war-ships in Northern