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 528 Shermans return march. [1864-5 plan was distasteful to Sherman ; but, greatly to his delight, a few days later he received a change of orders, or rather of suggestions. Since Grant had heard of Thomas 1 victory at Nashville, and the success of several Federal cavalry raids, the military problem seemed to be changing; and he frankly wrote to Sherman on the day of the latter's arrival at Savannah, " I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what can be done." By that time Sherman's views were "as clear as daylight." He laid before Grant in considerable detail his own plan of a march northward from Savannah by way of Columbia, South Carolina, to Raleigh, North Carolina. "The game is then up with Lee,' 1 he confidently added, " unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you, and fights me, in which case I should reckon on your being on his heels. If you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his entrenchments, I feel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country." Grant promptly accepted Sherman's suggestion, and directed him on December 27, 1864, to make his preparations without delay, to " break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond" as soon as he could. To facilitate this campaign a number of co-operative movements were directed by Grant, The interior of Alabama was threatened, both by operations from the Gulf Coast, and by a powerful cavalry expedition from Thomas' army in Tennessee. The 23rd corps of the Army of the Cumberland, under General Schofield, was brought to the East and sent by sea to the North Carolina coast, with orders to advance on Goldsborough a movement rendered possible by the fall of Fort Fisher at the mouth of Cape Fear river, which occurred on January 15, 1865. By agreement with Admiral Dahlgren the Federal fleet was held in readiness to establish a new base and afford communication and support if Sherman should desire or be forced to approach the coast during his northward march. The month of January, 1865, was occupied, partly in preparation, partly by delays due to rains which swelled the rivers and flooded the swamps. On February 1 Sherman started from Savannah on his third march, with an army of 60,000 men, provisions for twenty days, forage for seven, and ample ammunition for a great battle. While he did not anticipate an unobstructed advance, he rightly judged that the severest work of the expedition would be to conquer the natural obstacles in his path. The general course of the rivers was at right angles to the direction he had to follow, and, flowing through a low and sandy country, they were divided into many branches and bordered by broad and difficult swamps. To an ordinary army the route would have been, as the Confederate general officially reported it, impassable. As in the march to the sea, Sherman's army was stripped of all but the barest necessaries ; but these included 2500 waggons, 600 ambulances, a pontoon train with each of the four columns, and 68 guns. This however was not an ordinary army. It was made up of the