Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/514

 482 Battle of Antietam. [1862 action were practically impossible. It was a drawn battle, and only the approach of night put an end to the appalling slaughter. While the losses were almost equal, the Confederates were at a disad- vantage because they had suffered the greater proportional diminution , and, with the Potomac immediately behind them, it was injudicious at once to begin a retreat. But here again McClellan's hesitation proved their deliverance. It was not till the morning of the 19th that he ordered a renewal of the attack; and by that time the Confederates had retired over the river into Virginia, whereupon he reported with evident satisfaction that he had driven the enemy across the Potomac, and that Pennsylvania was safe. The first reports about the battle of Antietam were received by the country as news of a great victory ; and victory in a measure it certainly was, since it inflicted great losses upon the Confederate army and brought the invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania to an abrupt close. Presi- dent Lincoln seized the opportunity so presented to issue his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, a far-reaching executive act, which will be more fully treated in another chapter. But, as he became better acquainted with the facts in detail, Mr Lincoln was profoundly grieved that McClellan had not used his unique oppor- tunity completely to destroy the Confederate forces and practically to end the war. So decisive an effort seemed to be as far as ever beyond the capacity of the Union commander. All his care was to remain idle near the battle-field, to reinforce and reorganise his army, and to repair the wastes of the campaign. On October 6 Halleck telegraphed to him the President's peremptory order to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south; but he wasted twenty days more in excuses and complaints before he began his crossing, though he had had for nearly a month over 100,000 men present for duty under his immediate command, with as many more present for duty subject to his orders between him and Washington. To his positive command the President also added repeated criticism, advice and pressure. " Change position with the enemy," wrote the President, "and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? I say 'try'! If we never try, we shall never succeed If we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him In coming to us he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the entrenchments of Richmond." But argument and expostulation were alike wasted on McClellan. He was always haunted by the fear of defeat, never