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 348 A mismanaged war. [1814 failed signally, only ^500,000 being subscribed, and that at a discount of 20 per cent. In November of the same year the government failed to pay interest on its loans ; and in January, 1815, United States Six per cents, were at only 50 to 60. A financial crisis occurred in the middle States during August, 1814; in New England sedition grew more and more formidable. Delegates from the New England States met at Hartford in December, 1814, and, while waiting for a British success at New Orleans as the signal for revolt, showed open signs of an intention to secede from the Union. Even the South, which had made the war, was lukewarm ; and Virginia failed to raise the force which the President had a right to expect of her. On the British side the war was conducted with no great capacity, though, no doubt, this was due in part to the fact that attention was fixed upon the continent of Europe, even after Napoleon's fall. Twice, at least, great advantages were thrown away by armistices, with the object of patching up a peace. The navy was not skilfully employed ; and the failure to provide for the security of the Irish Sea and the English Channel was inexcusable. The importance of obtaining and holding the command of the great lakes was not perceived ; and, when the close of the war with France placed at the disposal of the govern- ment the pick of Wellington's army, this force was not used to the best advantage. The raid on Washington exasperated America; the great force assembled in Canada during the later months of the struggle effected nothing. The one lesson of importance taught by the conflict was the power of a weak navy to inflict enormous damage upon a com- mercial State. Sixteen British warships, and 1607 British merchantmen were taken by the Americans, while the loss of our flourishing trade with America was in itself a disaster, only matched by the heritage of bitterness which the war bequeathed.