Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/368

 336 The United States unprepared. [1812 war the British Ministers were swept into it. This result caused very grave embarrassment to England. Her strength was already taxed to the utmost by the prolonged struggle with France; her best seamen and ships were needed to maintain the blockade of the French ports ; her trade was in a depressed condition ; and acute foreign observers, such as Metternich, thought that the fabric of her empire was tottering. Napoleon was on the eve of his invasion of Russia when the United States declared war ; and Continental opinion anticipated his speedy success a success the more certain if British energy were diverted to a nev field in America. But for the disasters of the Russian campaign, followed by the crushing defeat of Leipzig, the war of 1812 might have rung the knell of freedom in Europe for a generation. The winter of that year was the crisis of the gigantic conflict ; and the feeling that at such a moment they were being assailed by their own kindred undoubtedly accounts for the peculiar bitterness which the British displayed towards the Americans in this war. In throwing down the gage of defiance the people of the United States had neglected to make due preparation for war. Their navy was insignificant, though what there was of it was of the finest quality, manned by excellent seamen and commanded by young officers. It counted only seven efficient frigates and nine smaller craft. The frigates were of the largest size, with batteries superior to those on board British ships of their own class, and with much stronger hulls. But for this state of affairs British officers were to blame. Captains of the royal navy had inspected one of the American frigates in a British harbour, and reported to the Admiralty that she did not differ in any essential from a British frigate, thus failing to grasp the preponderance in the vital elements of naval force which she possessed. Yet after two or three actions we find the British navy protesting that American frigates were really " ships-of-the-line in disguise." The army of the United States at the declaration of war numbered 6744 regular troops. Congress had previously sanctioned the further enlistment of 25,000 men ; but only 4000 raw recruits had been enrolled by June, 1812. In addition, the President was empowered to call for 50,000 volunteers and 100,000 militia, the latter to be provided by the various States according to their quotas. But these figures were never attained; recruits did not come forward in the number required; volunteers did not respond to the call ; and the militia were so devoid of training, and so ill-provided with experienced officers, that their value for offensive war was slight. Moreover, the militia were under the State governments ; and, as the New England States were bitterly opposed to the war, this was a serious impediment to the effective employment of the force. The Governor of Connecticut refused to permit his militia to serve outside his State, and was supported in this rebellious attitude by his State legislature. The Governor of Massachusetts declined to keep