Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/329

 1787] Appointment of judges. 297 courts was changed so as to make it read, " that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony." Appointment of the judges by the Senate rather than by the whole legislature was agreed to ; and then the committee made report to the Convention in three resolu- tions, accordingly. The first one provided for a Supreme Court, the judges to be appointed by the Senate ; the second that the national legislature might appoint inferior tribunals ; the third related to jurisdiction. The first resolution came up for consideration by the Convention on July 18. That a national judiciary should be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, was at once agreed to without dissent. The next clause, on the appointment of the judges, was a subject of difference. Gorham preferred appointment by the Senate to appoint- ment by the whole legislature; but even the Senate would be too large a body to make a good choice. He suggested appointment by the execu- tive, with the advice and consent of the Senate; that mode had long been practised in his own State and had worked well. Wilson preferred appointment by the executive, with the Massachusetts plan as a second choice. He accordingly moved that the judges be appointed by the executive. Martin favoured election by the Senate ; taken from all the States, the Senate would be well informed, and able to make a fit choice. Mason made the point that the question might depend somewhat on the mode to be adopted for trying an impeachment of the executive ; if the judges were to try the question, they should not be appointed by the executive. Besides, he found insuperable objections against giving the appointment to the executive ; mentioning, for one, that as the seat of government must be in some one State, the executive, remaining there during his term, would form local and personal attachments which would too much influence his choice. To the last suggestion Gorham replied that the executive would be responsible, not indeed, as he afterwards said, under any other penalty than the public censure, but still to that extent, for the discharge of his trust, and would therefore be careful to look through the States for proper men. Senators would be as likely to form local attachments, during their long terms, at the seat of government, as would the executive; and public bodies felt no personal responsibility. Rhode Island was an illustration. Gouverneur Morris thought that it would be improper that im- peachment of the executive should be tried by the judges. The judges, in such a case, would be drawn into intrigue with the legislature ; and as they too would be much about the seat of government, they might be improperly consulted beforehand. Hence it was not desirable that the judges should try an impeachment of the executive. Madison suggested CH. VIII.