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 1787] Eighth resolution. Council of Revision. 293 touching the House of Representatives, partly as one of those touching the Senate, and partly as the last section of the article relating to the executive. (8) COUNCIL. EXECUTIVE VETO. The eighth of the Randolph resolutions provided that the executive and a convenient number of the national judiciary ought to compose a Council of Revision, with authority to examine all Acts of the national legislature before going into operation, and all Acts of the State legis- latures, before a negative thereon should be final; and that the dissent of the said Council should amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the national legislature should be passed again, or that of a State legislature be again negatived by (a blank number of) members of each branch. The first clause of this resolution came on for consideration in committee of the whole House on June 4. Gerry doubted whether the judiciary ought to form part of the Council; the judges, in their official capacity as judges of the constitutionality of laws, would be able to check encroachments upon their department. He accordingly made a motion, which prevailed, to postpone the clause, in favour of one giving to the executive alone the right to negative legislation of the national government unless overruled by a vote (of two-thirds, as after- wards provided) of each branch. A motion by Wilson and Hamilton to give the executive an absolute negative was at the same time, after some debate, rejected by vote of all the States represented. The effect of adopting the Gerry motion was to set aside the whole of the eighth Randolph resolution, as it did away entirely with the proposed Council of Revision. On reconsideration Wilson moved to add to the Gerry proposal "a convenient number of the national judiciary." He thought it expedient to strengthen the executive by the influence of the judiciary in the negative of laws. The amendment was favoured by Madison. The great difficulty in making the executive office equal to its own defence arose from the nature of republican government. That form of government could not give to an individual citizen the settled pre-eminence, the weight in respect of t property, the personal interest against betraying the nation, which belonged to a hereditary magistracy. In a republic merit alone must be the ground of political preferment; but it would seldom happen that merit would be so great as to secure universal approval. The executive would be envied and assailed by disappointed competitors ; it would therefore need support. It would not have the great profits of office, or the permanent stake in the public welfare, which would place it beyond the reach of corruption from abroad; it would therefore need CH. VIII.