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 292 Impeachment of the President. [1737 equivalent to displacement, and would make the executive dependent upon those who were to impeach. Mason was opposed to the motion; should he who might commit the greatest wrong be above justice? He would punish principal as well as coadjutor. Appointment by electors would furnish a peculiar occasion for impeachment; the electors might be corrupted by the candidates. Franklin was in favour of retaining the clause, as just to the executive. History furnished but one example of a first magistrate being formally brought to public justice. What had been the method before? Assassination. Madison thought it indispensable that provision should be made to save the country from incapacity, negligence, or perfidy. The limitation of the term was not a sufficient security. In the case of a single executive, loss of capacity or corruption was par- ticularly within possibility. King made the chief reply. He expressed a fear that extreme caution in favour of liberty might enervate the government. He would have the House recur to the maxim, that the three great departments of State should be separate and distinct ; that the executive and judiciary should be so as well as the legislature ; that the executive should be so equally with the judiciary. Would that be the case if the executive should be impeachable? The judiciary, who were to be impeachable, stood on different ground; they were to hold office during good behaviour, while the executive would hold but for a short term, like the members of the legislature. Like them, he would be tried by the electors periodically for his behaviour, and continued in office or not, according to the manner in which he had executed his trust. Like them therefore he ought not to be subject to an intermediate trial by impeachment. Randolph, while favouring a provision for impeachment, still saw the difficulties and the need of caution. He suggested an idea which had fallen from Hamilton, of forming a body out of the judges of the State courts, and even of requiring some preliminary inquest whether just ground of impeachment existed. The motion to strike out the clause was lost ; and the provision that the executive should be removable on impeachment was adopted, two States, Massachusetts and South Carolina, voting nay. The subject went later, for adjustment in regard to the mode of impeachment, to the special committee of eleven, with other matters; which committee reported on September 4 a provision that the President should be removed on impeachment by the House of Representatives and con- viction by the Senate for treason or bribery. The Vice-president was then to exercise the powers of the office until the election of another President. The Convention added to " treason or bribery " the further words " or other high crimes or misdemeanours " ; and the provision then passed into the Constitution, partly as one of the regulations