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 286 Unity of the executive adopted. Mode of election. [i787 In answer to the last statement Butler contended that a single magistrate was most likely to meet the purpose of the remote parts of the country. A single magistrate would be responsible to the whole, and impartial to its varying interests. If three or more (the suggestion of three was a favourite one with those who opposed unity) should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In military matters this would be particularly mischievous. He himself had witnessed how a plurality of military heads had distracted Holland. Wilson saw no evidence that the people were opposed to a single magistrate ; they knew that a single magistrate was not a King. All the thirteen States, though agreeing in little else, agreed in having a single magistrate. Besides giving energy, despatch, and responsibility to the office, a single magistrate would secure tranquillity. Among three equal members he foresaw nothing but uncontrolled and continued animosity. The motion for a single magistrate prevailed ; seven States voting for, and three against it. The latter were New York, Delaware, and Maryland ; a majority of the delegates from Virginia being opposed to Governor Randolph, Virginia voted for the motion. The subject was not further agitated, and passed on through the draft Constitution of August 6 into the Constitution. There it appears in section 1 of Article II. On the next clause of the same seventh Randolph resolution, according to which the executive was to be elected by the national legislature, there was much debate, with alternating and conflicting results. Gouverneur Morris, opening the debate, again strongly opposed the clause. The executive would be the mere creature of the legislature if both appointed and impeachable by that body. He should be elected by the people at large. If the people elected the chief magistrate, they would not fail to prefer a person of distinction for character and services; if the legislature elected, the choice would be the work of intrigue, cabal, and faction. He accordingly moved to strike out the words "national legislature" and insert "citizens of the United States." Sherman believed, as he had expressed himself in committee, that the sense of the nation would be better expressed by the legislature than by the people at large. The people would not be sufficiently informed; and further, they would never give a majority of all the votes to one man. They would generally vote for someone of their own State, and the largest State would have the best chance. Wilson, replying to the argument that there would never be a majority for one person, said that a majority was not a necessary principle of election, nor was it required in any of the States. But allowing it full force, the difficulty might be overcome by the expedient adopted in Massachusetts, where the legislature, by a majority vote,