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 1787] Election of the executive. 285 the people rather than by the national legislature ; the people however voting not directly for the executive, but for electors who were to make the actual choice. This mode would give the people more confidence in the chief magistrate than if he were to be elected as proposed in the Randolph resolution. Gerry also opposed election by the national legislature ; that would create constant intrigue; the legislature and the candidates would bargain, and play into each other's hands. At the same time he feared that the mode proposed by Wilson would give a handle to the partisans of State authority, as tending to do away with the States. He seemed to prefer taking the suffrage of the States to that of electors, but was not clear in regard to the best course. Wilson's motion was lost, only two States voting for it; and the pro- vision of the Randolph resolution was then agreed to. Postponing the question of salary, the committee proceeded to consider a motion by Dickinson that the executive be removable by the national legislature, on the request of a majority of the legislatures of the States. This was a counter-motion to Wilson's. Wilson wished to reduce the small States to their place in a rule of proportion ; Dickinson to give the small States their place as States, at every point in the system. Madison and Wilson accordingly opposed the motion. It would enable a minority of the people to prevent the removal of a magistrate justly considered removable in the eyes of the majority; it would also open the door to intrigue against a magistrate whose administration, though just, was in some States unpopular. In reply, Dickinson, setting out with the proposition that the legislative, executive,^ and judiciary departments of the government should be made as independent as possible, said that an executive such as some appeared to have in mind (meaning a strong executive) was not consistent with a republic. A firm executive could exist only in a limited monarchy ; and though he considered a limited monarchy one of the best kinds of government, such a government was out of the question here. For the present plan the sources of stability were first, the division of the legislature into two branches, and secondly, the division of the country into States. That division ought to be maintained and considerable powers left with the States. Hence the States ought to possess influence as to removing the chief magistrate, upon occasion. The motion was lost, Delaware alone supporting it. It was now moved that the executive office be filled by one person. The motion was earnestly opposed by Randolph. First, it savoured of monarchy, to the very semblance of which the people were adverse ; secondly, unity was unnecessary; thirdly, the needful confidence would never be reposed in a single magistrate; fourthly, appointment would generally be from the neighbourhood of the capital, and the remoter parts of the country would have no standing. CH. VIII.