Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/306

 274 Question of election by State legislatures or by people. [i787 to consist of the men most distinguished in rank and property, so that it should bear as strong a likeness as possible to the British House of Lords ; and such men were more likely to be elected by the State legis- latures than by the people. And he favoured a large number ; this he said in evident anticipation of the suggestion that proportional represen- tation, already adopted for the first branch, would make the Senate too large. If the motion prevailed, it would therefore help the smaller States, as it actually did, in the struggle for equality in the Senate. The motion was supported by Sherman, who argued that the States would thus become interested in supporting the national government, and that due harmony would be maintained. Madison said that if the motion prevailed they would have to depart from proportional representation or admit into the Senate a very large number of members. The first was unjust, the second inexpedient. Enlarge the number of senators, and the vices which they wished to correct would increase. The weight of the Senate would be in inverse ratio to its numbers. The Roman tribunes lost influence and power as their number was increased ; they fell a prey to their aristocratic foes. So the more the representatives of the people were multiplied, the more they would have of the infirmities of the people. When the weight of a set of men depended only on personal character, the greater their number the greater their weight ; when it depended on the degree of political authority lodged in them, the smaller their number the greater their weight. Gerry observed that four methods of appointing the Senate had been mentioned, to wit : first, by the first branch of the national legislature. That would create dependence, and hence defeat the end proposed. Secondly, by the national executive. That would be a stride towards monarchy. Thirdly, by the people. The people composed two great interests, the landed and the commercial ; to draw both branches from the people would leave no security to the commercial interest, that of the people being chiefly agricultural. Fourthly, by the State legislatures. The elections being carried through this refinement, there would be apt to result some check in favour of the commercial interest against the landed. He favoured this last method. Dickinson argued the question with reference to the possibility that the smaller States would lose ground unless election to the Senate should be fixed in the State legislatures. That method fixed, the smallest as well as the largest State must have representation in the Senate, and have it by the State in its corporate capacity ; while otherwise, if pro- portional representation should be adopted for the Senate, it might be necessary to join the smallest States, Delaware and Rhode Island, to others in order to make up for their lack of population. It was indispensable to secure a certain degree of influence for the States ; this would establish a desirable check between the authorities. The proposed national system