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 1787] Third resolution. Two branches of the legislature. 269 He should accordingly be obliged to vote for the vicious principle of equality in the Senate, to provide some defence for the North. He did not believe in giving security to special interests ; there would be no end of demands. If slaves were property, as the three-fifths rule imported, the word " wealth " should not be struck out. On the motion to strike out the word " wealth " all the States voted aye, except Delaware, which was divided. This was on July 13; no material change was afterwards made. The clause accordingly passed through the committee of detail and the draft Constitution of August 6 into the Constitution itself, as the third part of Article I, section 2. There it reads, in substance, that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbersj these to be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The qualification of electors voting for representatives in the first branch caused some debate, which may be passed over. The Randolph resolutions were silent upon the subject; but it was finally voted that the qualification should be the same as that for electors in the several States respectively for the most numerous branch of their own legisla- tures ; and so the rule went into the Constitution, in Article I, section. (3) DIVISION OF THE LEGISLATURE. The third of the Randolph resolutions, providing for a legislature to consist of two branches, had been agreed to in committee of the whole, on May 31, without debate or dissent. On June 16, the Paterson resolutions being now before the same committee, the question whether the legislature should be divided or not was debated. Paterson argued that the reason for dividing a State legislature into two branches was not applicable to that of the Union. In the States party heat prevailed, and a check to hasty or ill-considered legislation might be necessary. In such a body as (the existing) Congress, the check was less necessary; and, besides, the delegations of the different States were checks upon each other. He urged also the objection of expense. Wilson replied that there was danger of legislative despotism. If the power of the legislature were not restrained, there could be neither liberty nor stability ; and it could be restrained only by dividing it into distinct and independent branches. In a single House there was no check but the virtue and good sense of its members. These remarks were made in considering the New Jersey plan in general. A more significant discussion took place a few days later, when the resolution of the committee (in favour of two Houses) came before the Convention ; it was now once more a case of the great States CH. VIII.