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 1787] Suffrage for the Senate. 259 States, the number of representatives being declared for the several States proportionately to population, with provision for change in the case of changes of population. This, so far as the principle of pro- portional representation was concerned, was adopted by the Convention, and was without further difficulty introduced into the Constitution (section 2 of Article I). The rule of suffrage in the Senate, or second branch of the legis- lature, was taken up by the Convention on the same day; and the struggle as to equality was renewed. The resolution reported by the committee of the whole House declared in favour of the same rule in the Senate as in the first branch. Ellsworth now moved that the rule in the second branch be the same as that in the Confederation. He did not regret the result of the vote fixing the rule for the first branch ; he hoped it would furnish ground of " compromise " for the rule in the second. The Virginia plan was partly national, partly federal; pro- portional representation was conformable to the national principle, equality to the federal. The former would secure the larger States, the latter the smaller. The large States would still have an influence which would maintain their superiority. Holland had a prevailing influence in the Dutch confederacy, notwithstanding equality. The small States must have the power to defend themselves; he could not admit there was no danger that the larger States would combine. Com- bination among the smaller States would be more difficult because they were numerous. Besides, had they not plighted their faith to the existing article of the Confederation touching suffrage ? New England, excepting Massachusetts, would not agree to the government proposed by the Randolph resolutions. Wilson, refusing to be moved by hints of disruption on the part of " twenty-two against ninety of the population," went on to say that the rule fixed for the first branch did not remove the objection to equality in the second. Equality in the Senate would enable the minority to control the majority in all cases. Seven States would control six, though the former had but twenty-four (sic) ninetieths of the population. They were framing a government for men, not for States. On every principle the rule of suffrage should be proportional in both branches of the govern- ment. The danger of combination among the larger States was imaginary ; rivalry was more likely, as Madison had said. Sometimes monarchy, sometimes aristocracy, had been feared by the other side ; if the executive were taken from one of the large States, would not the other two be thrown into the scale with the rest? Whence then the danger of monarchy ? Were the people of the three larger States more aristocratic than those of the smaller? How then could a danger of aristocracy arise from them ? They talked of States, and forgot what States were composed of. Was a real majority a hotbed of aristocracy ? Aristocracy was a government of the minority. Bad governments governed too CH. VIII. 17 2