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 1787] Suffrage for the first branch of the legislature. 255 The motion of King and Wilson however prevailed; seven States, among them Connecticut, voting aye, three States, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, nay. Maryland was divided. Questions of ratio were now briefly considered and agreed to ; New Jersey and Delaware opposing. The result was reported to the Con- vention in one of the resolutions of June 13. On the introduction of the Patterson resolutions, two days later, the subject was reopened by a further commitment of the resolution of June 13. Wilson again urged proportional representation. Inequality had always been a poison. It was so in Great Britain; the political liberty of that country, owing to the inequality of representation, was at the mercy of the rulers. Small bodies, further, were more easily seduced than large ones ; and in- equality would aggravate the difficulty. Hamilton considered that equality of suffrage would be fatal. The large States would not consent to it; or, if they did, would not do so for long. It shocked all ideas of justice. These remarks of Wilson and of Hamilton were made in the course of speeches in relation to the two plans of government, taken as a whole, which were then before the committee. The New Jersey plan was rejected a few days later in committee, and the Randolph resolutions as reported were at once reaffirmed. On June 26 the Convention accordingly took into consideration the resolution in regard to suffrage in the first branch of the legislature. The debate was opened by Martin, who strongly opposed proportional representation. The States, he said, were equally sovereign and free; and being equal, they could not in his opinion confederate so as to give up equality without giving up their liberty. The proposition before the Convention therefore was a proposition for enslaving ten States; Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania had forty-two ninetieths of the votes of the country, and could do what they pleased unless some miraculous union of the other ten took place ; they had to gain but one of them to make themselves complete masters. If the large States had no interest in doing wrong to the smaller, there could be no danger in equal suffrage. In regard to dangers of dissolution, he said that the large States were weak in proportion to their extent, and powerful only in their votes. The small States therefore would have nothing to fear from dissolution ; and he would rather have partial confederacies than the plan before the House. Williamson, on the other side, considered it mathematically plain that States which were equally sovereign at first would, on parting with an equal proportion of sovereignty, remain equally sovereign. He thought they should also take into account the prospect of the addition of new States from the West. These would be small and poor, and would accordingly be tempted to combine to lay burdens upon the older States, which they could the more easily do under equal suffrage. This suggestion concerning the West was repeated by others.