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 214 Burgoynes expedition. [1777 impeded the navigation of the Delaware by various obstacles, and also by fortifying two small islands. These fortifications were reduced and the impediments cleared away. But the success, such as it was, was effected at so great a cost of life and after such delay that the moral discouragement went far to outweigh the material gain. Meanwhile these qualified and incomplete victories were far more than outweighed by a crushing defeat of the British in another quarter. The one really brilliant success which, so far, had been obtained by the British army was the defence of Canada. Nevertheless Carleton was superseded in favour of Burgoyne, a man of undoubted personal courage, but immeasurably inferior to Carleton in every other quality of soldier- ship, as well as in colonial experience. A plan of campaign was arranged, probably on Burgoyne's suggestion, theoretically practicable, but so com- plex and so beset with difficulties of detail, and threatening, in the case of failure, consequences so disastrous, that any prudent commander would have shrunk from it. Burgoyne was to advance from Canada by the lakes and the upper Hudson. A co-operating force was to ascend the Hudson and join hands with him. Had the scheme succeeded, the result would have been to isolate the New England colonies. If, as a first step, the British had secured the control of the lower Hudson and then placed at or near Albany a force strong enough to keep in check any American troops that might endeavour to move in the direc- tion of the lakes, the enterprise might have been feasible ; but to adjust two simultaneous movements so far apart would in no circumstances have been easy ; and the difficulty was enhanced by the character of the country in which Burgoyne had to operate. Whatever chances of suc- cessful co-operation there might have been, these were finally destroyed by a gross official blunder, through which the orders explaining the campaign to Howe were delayed and did not reach him till after he had committed himself to operations on the Delaware. The blame of this was laid, probably with justice, on Germaine. In July, 1777, Burgoyne set out with close upon 3000 troops, including 500 Indians. Whatever might be Burgoyne's failings as a soldier, he was a humane and honourable gentleman ; and his deter- mination to restrain the ferocity of these allies led to disputes which rendered them a hindrance instead of a help. At the outset all went well. The Americans evacuated Ticonderoga. In their flight several of their boats were captured; and a detachment of Burgoyne's army under General Fraser overtook a portion of the retreating force, and bringing them to action, defeated them with heavy loss. When the descent of Lake Champlain was completed and it became necessary to advance by land, Burgoyne's difficulties began. Encumbered with heavy baggage and a large artillery train, he had to make his way through swampy forests. This was fatal in a case where everything depended on rapidity of movement. For now, as throughout the war, the British