Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/202

 170 The invasion of Canada. [1775 doubt, an invasion may be merely a necessary measure of defensive policy. The recognition of the New England forces as a continental army and the appointment of a commander-in-chief were virtually declarations of war; and there was no essential difference between fighting in Massachusetts and fighting on the St Lawrence. But to the ordinary man taking obvious and superficial views, Bunker Hill would seem no more than resistance to local tyranny. It was practically certain that very few of those who wished to see Great Britain retain her sovereignty over the colonies in any form would continue their sympathy after British territory had been invaded. On the other hand, the leaders of the rebellion might well feel that the sooner the colonies were com- mitted decisively and irrevocably, the better ; and that a bold policy of aggression would be the most likely means of winning foreign support. Yet the whole of their past history might well have warned the colonists of the magnitude of the task they were undertaking. It was no light matter to maintain communications and to arrange for supplies in such a country as that which separated the colonies from the St Lawrence. This difficulty was increased by the fact that the invasion was to be made by two separate forces starting from widely separated bases. The main body was to advance from Ticonderoga, capture Montreal and then descend to Quebec. This force, numbering 2400 men, was under the command of Richard Montgomery, a retired British officer, of great courage and personal attractiveness of character. He had served in the late war against Prance in Canada, and, having married a native of New York, regarded himself as an adopted son of that colony. A smaller subsidiary force, 1100 in number, was to undertake the far more difficult task* of following the Kennebec, then crossing the water- shed and striking the upper waters of a stream which ran northward into the St Lawrence. This involved a march through more than two hundred miles of forest, where no supplies could be obtained and transport was a matter of great difficulty. This force was placed under the command of Benedict Arnold of New York, who had already done good service as a volunteer in the capture of an English vessel on Lake Champlain ; and probably no leader could have been found better fitted to inspire men engaged in a desperate enterprise with fearlessness and confidence. In September, 1775, the invasion was commenced. Everything went well for a while with Montgomery's force. The frontier forts of Chamblee and St John's, inadequately supplied and garrisoned, made but little resistance ; and after their fall the British commander thought it prudent to evacuate Montreal. As might have been foreseen, the real difficulty lay with the eastern branch of the expedition. It did not start till the middle of September, and thus all the hardships and difficulties of the march were greatly increased. Moreover, the only means of