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 While German national interests were thus subordinated to those of a family, while the nominal control of the Empire's foreign policy was vested in the hands of one who regarded Germany as only a piece in the game of dynastic ambitions, the German people reaped no corresponding advantage from increased security. The endless roll of principalities and powers which adorned Charles Vs style and dazzled the eyes of the Electors proved no more than a paper wall of defence. The Emperor's strength was also his weakness; it was dissipated all over Europe, and though Germans turned the scale in Italy, few troops came from Spain or Burgundy to defend the Empire against the Turks or the French. While Francis I and Solyman wielded swords, Charles V seemed to brandish an armoury of cumbrous weapons, which were only of use if used all together, and were frequently unavailable at the critical moment. Germany had to look to itself for defence, and a further element of separatism was fostered by the consequent tendency of individual Princes to make arrangements with Charles' enemies behind the Emperor's back.

The nation was not long left in doubt as to the character of the ruler whom it had chosen or the objects he meant to pursue. German envoys to Spain were not well pleased with their youthful sovereign's obvious devotion to priestly rites, or with the intimation that they must negotiate in the Flemish tongue because Charles could speak neither German nor Latin. Nor was his first act as Emperor calculated to reassure his people. Amid the confusion of the interregnum Ulrich, the dispossessed Duke of Württemberg, attempted to recover his duchy; he was easily defeated by the Swabian League, which ceded its conquest to Charles on repayment of the cost of the campaign. Ulrich was a ruffian who deserved no consideration, but his vices did not abrogate the rights of his heirs, and it was utterly repugnant to German custom and sentiment for the Emperor to confer a fief upon himself. No territory, however, was so convenient for the extension of Austria's influence as Württemberg; with it in Habsburg hands, Zevenbergen thought that Charles and his brother would dominate Germany, and so Württemberg passed into Habsburg possession, with Zevenbergen as its governor.

Troubles in Spain and adverse winds delayed Charles' departure from the shores of Galicia until May, 1520, and his two interviews with Henry VIII further postponed his coronation at Aachen until October 23. There he swore to observe the promises made before his election, and on November 1 he summoned a Diet to meet in the following January. He then made his way up the Rhine to Worms, where, on January 28, the' day sacred to Charles the Great, he opened perhaps the most famous of all the Diets in German history (1521).

The dramatic episode of Luther's appearance and condemnation by the Edict of Worms has, however, been allowed to obscure the more important business of the Diet and to convey a somewhat misleading