Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 2.djvu/129

 Montmorency had the advantage through his powerful character, his industry, and will; the Guises through their skill in winning the people and the interests to their side; in the Church, in the army, in the Parlement their influence was great and was carefully developed. On the other hand, the immense ransoms exacted from Montmorency in 1559 for himself and his relatives impoverished his estate, and the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis was unpopular and diminished his credit. Thus, after the death of Henry II the advantage lay with the younger rivals of the Constable.

The changes in the system of the Spanish monarchy during the period are even less significant than those in France. The Cortes of Castile «ontinued to meet and to retain their hold upon finance. The servicio became a regular impost, voted every three years. On the other hand, the alcabcda was a ground for frequent bargaining between the King and the Cortes, and the advantage fell to the latter; for the total nett income raised from this source did not increase during the reign, while the purchasing power of money was diminished by at least one half. The real limitation of the royal power in Spain is seen in the refusal of all three Estates, exceptionally summoned to the Cortes of 1538, to agree to Charles' proposal to raise money by a new excise on meat. The power of the Crown over the Cortes, if it was increasing, was increasing slowly, and its increase was due to the extension of royal authority in the towns, where the royal corregidor was becoming more autocratic, and the regidores themselves were appointed by the Crown. The pressure of the hidalgos for admission to municipal office, which is a notable feature of the time, would tend also gradually to divorce the ruling class in the towns from those who carried on its business and felt the real pinch of tyranny or maladministration.

In Spain more than elsewhere the interests of the Church and the Crown were closely linked. The Church looked to royal protection against heresy and against the Cortes. The King looked to the Church for supplies in time of need; he had its good government thoroughly at heart; he supported and moderated the action of the Inquisition so far as he could, for the Inquisition, though based on royal authority, was not entirely under his control. The forcible conversion of the Moriscos of Valencia in 1525 and following years attests the zeal, rather than the wisdom of Charles. The flight of a large part of this industrious class, and the discontent and apprehensions of those who remained, living as they did in constant fear of the Holy Office, was a main cause of the impoverishment of a considerable part of Spain. Charles seems himself to have perceived his error, and the severity of the decrees against the Moriscos was considerably relaxed during his later years.

In Spain also the administrative developments are more conspicuous than the constitutional. The business of government was becoming more and more complicated. Under Ferdinand and Isabella we have