Page:Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. (532 F.2d 674).pdf/9

 choice of air-conditioners for each type of automobile.” (Emphasis added.)

Although the “independent business judgment” finding seems to have been the basis for the court’s summary judgment order on February 28, 1972, the court reconsidered finding No. 17 on May 31, 1972, and replaced it with the following:

"“* * * [T]here is no credible evidence that * * * [Distributor’s] ceasing to handle * * * [Calnetics] air-conditioners on an exclusive basis or at all was the result of any combination or conspiracy by * * * [Distributor] resulting from its voluntary act or acts.” (Emphasis added.)"

Taking into consideration the February 28 findings along with the May 31 amendments, we conclude that the district court’s final rationale for the summary judgment order was not that Distributor had exercised independent business judgment in ceasing to handle Calnetics’ air conditioners, but that the cessation of business was not the result of a combination or conspiracy resulting from any voluntary act on the part of Distributor.

In making the May 31 amendment, the court apparently realized that, if the summary judgment in favor of Distributor was based on the independent-business-judgment rationale, it must also grant summary judgment in favor of VW and Subsidiary on the § 7 claim for damages. However, the court did not grant summary judgment in favor of VW or Subsidiary, and, to make its rulings consistent, reconsidered the Distributor findings and amended them so that the Distributor summary judgment would be based on grounds of lack of voluntariness. In doing so, however, the court adopted an erroneous theory. The involuntary nature of one’s participation in a conspiracy to monopolize is no defense. An antitrust conspirator can be liable for damages even though he participates only under coercion. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 375 (9th Cir.), ''cert. denied'', 355 U.S. 835, 78 S.Ct. 54, 2 L.Ed.2d 46 (1957); Otto Milk Co. v. United States Dairy Farmers Cooperative Ass’n, 261 F.Supp. 381, 385 (W.D.Pa.1966), aff’d, 388 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1967).

Although the court in granting summary judgment misapplied substantive law, the judgment should not be reversed if it is correct for some other reason. See Archer v. United States, 217 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1954), ''cert. denied'', 348 U.S. 953, 75 S.Ct. 441, 99 L.Ed. 745 (1955); 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶56.27[1], at 2975 (2d ed. 1948, as amended, 1975). Thus, we must reach Distributor’s argument that summary judgment was correct because Calnetics failed to produce any credible evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer conspiracy in restraint of trade. According to Distributor, the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the undisputed facts was the one the trial judge first drew: that Distributor ceased doing business with Calnetics for purely independent business reasons.

In support of its claim that a genuine issue exists as to Distributor’s motivation, Calnetics points to certain undisputed evidence: (1) that in June, 1969, Distributor issued a 10,000-unit purchase order to Calnetics for the 1970 model; (2) that VW acquired Subsidiary on September 26, 1969; (3) that VW urged Distributor to purchase Subsidiary’s air conditioners, but at that time Distributor told VW that it was “satisfied” with its present suppliers; (4) that after an October 15, 1969, meeting between VW, Subsidiary, and Distributor executives, Distributor promised that it would join VW’s and Subsidiary’s marketing efforts; (5) that Subsidiary could not satisfy the