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16 not known how to draw a general inference from particular facts, or to deduce his verdict therefrom, but because he has omitted so to examine and test his generalization, as to render it admissible in the argument.

Paradoxical as it may seem to some, Induction is the least difficult and prominent part of the discovery of natural laws. That which distinguishes the great inductive philosopher, a Newton, a Lavoisier, or a Darwin, from men of ordinary intellect, is much less the power of suggesting a general law, than the rapidity and accuracy with which he traces its consequences, and his conscientiousness in rejecting it when any weak point occurs in its verification. This and the power of analysis, of distinguishing the partial and independent facts of which any observed phenomenon is made up, are the chief characteristics of the so-called inductive mind. Now these processes are eminently susceptible of cultivation. Art can never supersede Nature here or elsewhere, but as any well-trained Artist learns by experience to detect at a glance a false proportion, or an unnatural curve, which would escape the notice of a tyro ; so the man who is practised in the employment of the processes of ratiocination or analysis of fact acquires skill in detecting the weak point in a statement of supposed fact or inference from evidence, whatever be the matter upon which he has to judge. Large acquaintance with fact on the particular subject contemplated is of course necessary to enable him to exercise his power to any eminent degree, but the process is the same whether the matter considered is a phenomenon of physical science, or a legal enquiry.

Another faculty not less important to the man of the world is that of observation, of noticing rapidly and accurately the important points of an object or an event. This too may be trained to a considerable extent by the study of physical and natural science ; but the experience gained is more special in kind, and therefore comparatively less valuable than the education of the reasoning faculties, because the value of an observation depends in great measure on the previous acquaintance of the observer with its subject-matter. It is in the main a rapid process of comparison and selection,—comparison with what is known, and selection for special record of that which is new or important. Still the experience is valuable, and the student may be at all events taught by habit, to guard against that chief stumbling block of the uninstructed, the failure to distinguish what is seen, and what is assumed or inferred.

We have already spoken of the value of all studies in Natural Science conscientiously pursued, in warning us against prejudice,