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Rh or to the affiliated Colleges, without control or restriction. Such a course would evidently be impracticable and absurd : but the University might with advantage limit its functions to the enumeration of those works best fitted to convey instruction on each subject of examination, taking care to include such a variety as will give a fair representation of different views on all important debateable points. Thus, to take an instance or two from those branches of Science with which it is our especial province to deal in the present article, we would include in such a list Dr. Whewell’s Philosophy of Inductive Science on the one hand, and Mill’s Logic of Induction on the other, and some acquaintance with the views of both of these writers should be required of all examinees in Mental Science. In Zoology, we would include both Owen and Darwin, and in Geology, Buckland, Lyell, and Phillips, giving preference in each case to the most eminent expositors of the rival views. It has been remarked by Dr. Whewell, that the only mode of understanding the definitions of a Science, is to learn its history ; to follow the conflicts of opposing views, and trace out the process by which in past time, prejudices of judgment and confusion of thought have been gradually eliminated, and clear and consistent conceptions established. But there is an additional lesson to be learned in such a study ; a lesson equally important to men of all creeds and professions ; to the administrator or to the savant : the lesson which may be learned from all history, if treated in a philosophical and large-minded spirit, and if the attention be not frittered away on stories of Court intrigues and battle-field slaughter, but which can nowhere be found more clearly and prominently indicated than in the history of the avowed search for abstract truth.

We, like our fathers, have to fight the old, old enemy—prejudice ; to learn that a thing is not necessarily true, because we have been accustomed so to regard it, that a man is not necessarily a bad member of Society, because he holds opinions different to those which are habitually transmitted from father to son in the nation or sect to which we belong. Is this an obsolete charge? Is prejudice in its grosser forms no longer the arch enemy of social advancement? Turn where we will,—to Theology—to Sociology,—to Politics,—to the calm dispassionate domain of pure intellectual science, to ethics or to physics,—do we not find prejudice rampant ; setting man against many class against class, race against race? How many of our opinions do we hold as the result of calm and dispassionate research? How often do we enter on any discussion, with the pure and simple desire to get at the truth? Is even our so called ‘science,’ as held by most of us, anything more than a mass of dogma, which we have