Page:Calcutta Review (1925) Vol. 16.djvu/319

304 Ethics, however, must put up its back and refuse to be dazzled and misled by the mere size of the activity.

In at least some cases, therefore, crime and genius do not differ, except of course in magnitude, and, therefore, also in consequences. In some cases, at least, the mental attitude is the same in both. There is another and a more important point. Genius usually connotes intellectual greatness rather than moral perfection. Nay more; genius is frequently found tainted with moral perversion. The lives of many great men—of the Shelleys and Byrons and others—will illustrate this truth. These had in them elements which we cannot but applaud; but at the same time, many of them had striking defects of character which we cannot but deplore.

The argument perhaps has been mainly based on an induction by simple enumeration. But from the frequency of the association of genius with moral defects, it may be fairly presumed that there is some necessary connection. If the connection can be shown to be illusory, Ethics will be relieved of a great problem. If, on the other hand, genius is really a case of moral pathology, Ethics has a Gordian knot to untie or to cut.

Genius, like other characters, must be either approved or condemned; there is no via media. But if crime and genius are but two sides of the same shield, then, to approve genius is to approve crimes of large dimensions. On the other hand, to disapprove genius, is to put a premium upon the ordinary and the mediocre and to keep humanity perpetually dwarfed. We are thus on the horns of a dilemma. Assuming that there is a necessary connection between a certain amount of moral turpitude and the phenomenon of genius, society must be prepared either to relax its moral standard or to forego the luxury of owning a genius.

If we rigorously adhere, to the moral ideal as it is usually understood, then, we may be good men, but not perhaps great. If we do not admit even the slightest deviation from the