Page:Calcutta Review (1925) Vol. 16.djvu/265

250 be so inherent in the nature of God that it cannot be overcome. There is, however, misunderstanding here. We must regard the ultimate power from two points of view. As infinite potentiality and energy of Idea, it is perfect, eternal and unchangeable. In realising its potentiality in a world of finite things, it gives rise to, and therefore experiences an inexhaustible series of changes. This passing from abstract potentiality into the concrete actuality of finite worlds, may be described from the finite point of view as a need and imperfection. But it is just in this that its perfection consists; viz., in thereby passing eternally from abstract power into concrete life. Or rather it is the unity of the two correlative ‘moments’—the eternal oneness of the Idea and the inexhaustible process of self-realisation—the unity of one and many—that its perfection consists. Neither would be anything without the other; together they constitute highest reality and Good. The separation of the two correlatives and the completion and cessation of the process would mean relapse into universal death. Together in their correlation they are eternal life. Viewed therefore sub specie deterni, the apparent imperfection thus ascribed to God, is absolute Perfection.

Yet this objection may have been what actuated Aristotle and Plotinus in their attempt to break off all connection between the being of God and that of the world, as between perfection and imperfection. But by so doing they made God to be an abstraction merely, which, in philosophy as in practical life, could be easily ignored (e. g., Scepticism, Epicureanism). The Biblical doctrine of the Logos or Divine Idea rather pointed to a reconciliation of absolute and relative in one perfect being.

Future existence.—The question may be asked; how does Idealism affect the question of the continuation of the finite Self after death? Clearly, by making the essence of human