Page:CTRL0000034600 - Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021).pdf/203

203 starting with January 6th, in terms of authorizing the D.C. National Guard to arrive?

No. I didn't—I didn't sense any resistance. I sensed, prior to January 6th, a great reluctance by General Milley to have the military involved any more than is absolutely necessary, and I thought that was appropriate, and we were all in agreement. But, on January 6th, I didn't hear anything about any reluctance.

I know there was some complaints afterwards about delays and things of that nature. You'd have to talk to them about it, but I think those delays were driven by the fact that the mayor insisted that the Guard be unarmed and that they not have body armor. And so, when they were asked to assist, they then had to go back to the armory so that they were appropriately equipped, and that took some time. I think that's what accounted for the delay, if there was a delay.

Did you sense any resistance from any White House official on January 6th in terms of responding to the Capitol that day?

No. It was the opposite. There was a certain amount of urgency clear in the phone calls and the communications from both the chief of staff and the White House counsel basically saying: Get over there and fix this.

What's the single most—what do you attribute as the single most—biggest failure of that day in terms of securing the Capitol? Who do you attribute that to? What do you attribute that to?

The Capitol Police failure to maintain the perimeter. I mean, there were certainly heroic acts by the Capitol Police that day. I would never undercut what those individual officers did, but there was a complete failure of planning and leadership.

There's no reason they should have gotten in that building. The Capitol Police had more than enough manpower. They were the agency that was best equipped and best positioned to defend the Capitol. Everyone knew that the Capitol was at risk.