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Iran’s ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: Beginning on page 31, strike line 16 and all that follows through page 35, line 25. At the end, add the following: TITLE II—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN SEC. 200. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ‘‘Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act’’. SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following: (1) On April 2, 2015, President Barack Obama said, ‘‘Other American sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism, its human rights abuses, its ballistic missile program, will continue to be fully enforced.’’. (2) On July 7, 2015, General Martin Dempsey, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, ‘‘Under no circumstances should we relieve the pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities.’’. (3) On July 29, 2015, in his role as the top military officer in the United States and advisor to the President, General Dempsey confirmed that his military recommendation was that sanctions relating to the ballistic missile program of Iran not be lifted. (4) The Government of Iran and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps have been responsible for the repeated testing of illegal ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear device, including observed tests in October and November 2015 and March 2016, violating United Nations Security Council resolutions. (5) On October 14, 2015, Samantha Power, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, said, ‘‘One of the really important features in implementation of the recent Iran deal to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program is going to have to be enforcement of the resolutions and the standards that remain on the books.’’. (6) On December 11, 2015, the United Nations Panel of Experts concluded that the missile launch on October 10, 2015, ‘‘was a violation by Iran of paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010)’’. (7) On January 17, 2016, Adam Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, stated, ‘‘Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a significant threat to regional and global security, and it will continue to be subject to international sanctions. We have consistently made clear that the United States will vigorously press sanctions against Iranian activities outside of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—including those related to Iran’s support for terrorism, regional destabilization, human rights abuses, and ballistic missile program.’’. (8) On February 9, 2016, James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, testified that, ‘‘We judge that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them. Iran’s ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran’s progress on space launch vehicles—along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including ICBMs.’’. (9) On March 9, 2016, Iran reportedly fired two Qadr ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,000 miles and according to public reports, the missiles were marked with a statement in Hebrew reading, ‘‘Israel must be wiped off the arena of time.’’. (10) On March 11, 2016, Ambassador Power called the recent ballistic missile launches

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by Iran ‘‘provocative and destabilizing’’ and called on the international community to ‘‘degrade Iran’s missile program’’. (11) On March 14, 2016, Ambassador Power said that the recent ballistic missile launches by Iran were ‘‘in defiance of provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2231’’. (12) Iran has demonstrated the ability to launch multiple rockets from fortified underground facilities and mobile launch sites not previously known. (13) The ongoing procurement by Iran of technologies needed to boost the range, accuracy, and payloads of its diverse ballistic missile arsenal represents a threat to deployed personnel of the United States and allies of the United States in Europe and the Middle East, including Israel. (14) Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, testified in a hearing before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate on July 7, 2015, that, ‘‘[T]he reason that we want to stop Iran from having an ICBM program is that the I in ICBM stands for intercontinental, which means having the capability to fly from Iran to the United States, and we don’t want that. That’s why we oppose ICBMs.’’. (15) Through recent ballistic missile launch tests the Government of Iran has shown blatant disregard for international laws and its intention to continue tests of that nature throughout the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. (16) The banking sector of Iran has facilitated the financing of the ballistic missile programs in Iran and evidence has not been provided that entities in that sector have ceased facilitating the financing of those programs. (17) Iran has been able to amass a large arsenal of ballistic missiles through its illicit smuggling networks and domestic manufacturing capabilities that have been supported and maintained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and specific sectors of the economy of Iran. (18) Penetration by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps into the economy of Iran is well documented including investments in the construction, automotive, telecommunications, electronics, mining, metallurgy, and petrochemical sectors of the economy of Iran. (19) Items procured through sectors of Iran specified in paragraph (18) have dual use applications that are currently being used to create ballistic missiles in Iran and will continue to be a source of materials for the creation of future weapons. (20) In order to curb future illicit activity by Iran, the Government of the United States and the international community must take action against persons that facilitate and profit from the illegal acquisition of ballistic missile parts and technology in support of the missile programs of Iran. SEC. 202. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the ballistic missile program of Iran represents a serious threat to allies of the United States in the Middle East and Europe, members of the Armed Forces deployed in the those regions, and ultimately the United States; (2) the testing and production by Iran of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear device is a clear violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which was unanimously adopted by the international community; (3) Iran is using its space launch program to develop the capabilities necessary to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten the United States, and the Director of National Intelligence has assessed that Iran would use ballistic missiles

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as its ‘‘preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons’’; and (4) the Government of the United States should impose tough primary and secondary sanctions against any sector of the economy of Iran or any Iranian person that directly or indirectly supports the ballistic missile program of Iran as well as any foreign person or financial institution that engages in transactions or trade that support that program. SEC. 203. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS BY IRAN TO ACQUIRE BALLISTIC MISSILE AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY. (a) CERTAIN PERSONS.—Section 1604(a) of

the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by inserting ‘‘, to acquire ballistic missile or related technology,’’ after ‘‘nuclear weapons’’. (b) FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—Section 1605(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘, to acquire ballistic missile or related technology,’’ after ‘‘nuclear weapons’’. SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS THAT ACQUIRE OR DEVELOP BALLISTIC MISSILES.

Section 5(b)(1)(B) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended— (1) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘would likely’’ and inserting ‘‘may’’; and (2) in clause (ii)— (A) in subclause (I), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and inserting a semicolon; (B) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); and (C) by inserting after subclause (I) the following: ‘‘(II) acquire or develop ballistic missiles and the capability to launch ballistic missiles; or’’. SEC. 205. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN. (a) IN GENERAL.—Title II of the Iran Threat

Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘Subtitle C—Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran ‘‘SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS. ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—In this subtitle: ‘‘(1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term

‘agricultural commodity’ has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602). ‘‘(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term ‘appropriate committees of Congress’ means— ‘‘(A) the committees specified in section 14(2) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note); and ‘‘(B) the congressional defense committees, as defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code. ‘‘(3) CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLETHROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms ‘correspondent account’ and ‘payable-through account’ have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code. ‘‘(4) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘foreign financial institution’ has the meaning of that term as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 104(i) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(i)). ‘‘(5) GOOD.—The term ‘good’ has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).

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