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STILWELL'S MISSION TO CHINA

Indian Division on the east bank of the Sittang River. The two brigades were cut to pieces. On 2 March the Japanese crossed the Sittang River, moved past Pegu, and swung south on Rangoon.5 When after the Battle of the Sittang Bridge the menace to Rangoon became obvious and imminent, the AMMISCA personnel in Rangoon on Magruder's orders destroyed all movable lend-lease stores. Much equipment had been sent north, the rate hitting 1,000 tons a day as disaster neared, but it was necessary to burn 972 trucks in various stages of assembly, 5,000 tires, 1,000 blankets and sheeting, and a ton of odds and ends. A great deal of lend-lease was transferred to the imperial forces in Burma: 300 Bren guns with 3,200,000 rounds, 1,000 submachine guns with 180,000 rounds of ammunition, 260 jeeps, 683 trucks, 6 and 100 field telephones. The Japanese took Rangoon on 6 March, while the 17th Indian Division fought its way out of a possible Japanese encirclement and fell back north up the Irrawaddy valley. The Japanese 33d Division began to follow the 17th Indian Division up the Irrawaddy valley. The 55th Division in the Sittang valley was facing the 1st Burma Division, which latter had not been engaged as a unit. The orders from General Wavell to the British defenders were to hold upper Burma as long as possible to cover the oil fields at Yenangyaung, to keep contact with the Chinese, and to protect the road being hastily built from Assam to Burma.7 As of early March, the Japanese plans for the next phase of the Burma campaign seem to have been elastic, and still in process of formulation. They suggest an intention to make the main Japanese effort via Rangoon-ToungooMandalay, which if successful would isolate Burma from China and thus cut off any Chinese troops who might come to the aid of Burma's defenders. Japanese reinforcements arriving through Rangoon would be committed to the 8 Japanese right. The most hopeful note in the Burma military situation was that Chinese troops were moving in, in force. Shortly after the "qualified acceptance" of Chinese reinforcements and the injury to Chinese pride caused by the Tulsa incident it became necessary for the British to ask China's aid in defending Burma. It was then apparent to them that the "violence, fury, skill, and might 5 (1) Japanese Study 88. (2) Interrogs, Lt Col Minoru Kouchi, Lt Gen Yutaka Takeuchi. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (See Bibliographical Note.) General Takeuchi places the Japanese strength at 16,000. 6 There were, however, 19,052 tons of lend-lease materials in dead storage which were left behind: "miscellaneous light loads for dead storage, 903 tons; industrial machinery, 3,030½ tons; electrical equipment, 686 tons; and construction materials, 14,432½ tons." Rpt, St. John to Stilwell, 10 Mar 42, sub: Rpt on Rangoon Opn from 1 Jan 42 to Evacuation Date. Item 47, Port of Rangoon Folder, CT 42, Dr 4, KCRC. 7 (1) "Report by General the Honourable Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, K.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., on Operations in Burma from 5th March, 1942, to 20th May, 1942," Supplement to The 8 London Gazette, March 11, 1948, pars. 3, 15, 16. (2) Japanese Study 88. Japanese Study 88.