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C00036554 ENDNOTES

1. See, for example# the works of Axelrod (1), Ben-Zvi (2), Handel (3), Whaley (4), and Wohlstetter (5).

2. See, for example, Cave Brown (6), Johnson (7), Jones (8), Lewin (9), Reit (10), Stevenson (11), and Winterbotham (12).

3. See, for example, Betts (13), Jervis (14), and Kirk (15).

4. It should be noted that the strategic cases considered are those that ultimately culminated in a battle. Other cases that did not result in an actual engagement are not included. There is some evidence to suggest that inclusion of these cases would lower estimates of the success of deception. An example of an unsuccessful deception effort was COCKADE, the overall deception plan for 1943, intended to tie up the German military awaiting a notional Allied invasion across the Channel. COCKADE did not culminate in a military engagement and thus is not in the data bank. (See Cruickshank (39) for a more pessimistic assessment of the success of deception efforts in World War II).

5. Referring to "...the classic situation which General Magruder exploited at Gaines's Mill: they had merely to persuade the enemy to continue to believe what he already wanted to believe" (Lewin (20)). Lewin's source for this Civil War analogy is Bruce Catton (21). Other accounts of the action at Gaines's Mill (see Freeman (22)) would credit Lee or Jackson with the wisdom rather than Magruder.

6. The following table shows the upper 95% confidence estimate (one sided) for a proportion when no instances of some event are observed in a sample size of N.