Page:CIAdeceptionMaximsFactFolklore 1980.pdf/43

C00036554 answers the question, "Is anybody listening?" (i.e., is this channel effective), a sine qua none to the design of effective deception. It is an interesting footnote to the overall success of the Allied D-Day deceptions that those directed at Norway were not successful. According to Kahn (51):

...most of the energetic Allied radio deception in the north of Britain to simulate the preparations of an invasion force went unheard by the Germans. The reasons seem to be that not one of the radio reconnaissance units of the German 20th Army, occupying Norway, was paying the least bit of attention: all were far away in Finland, facing east and 1istening hard to the Russians. The consequence was that Roenne concluded that any landings in Norway would be secondary; Meyer-Detrinq concurred. Hitler believed the same thing, since he thought the main invasion would come in France. Yet he never withdrew a single soldier from Norway to oppose this main assault. Why? Because it was his "zone of destiny" in the war owing to its ability to protect his shipments of Finnish nickel ore, his northern flank, and his U-boat departures. But Allied deception had nothing to do with all this. Hitler kept major forces in Norway entirely on his own volition.

This is an interesting example of how deceptions can seem to fail, yet "succeed." In practical terms, such misinterpretations of our observed response, or lack thereof, often result from less than perfect understanding and modeling of the deception target.