Page:CIAdeceptionMaximsFactFolklore 1980.pdf/41

 context, however, it is an active principle designed to exploit this tendency to misperception.

Successful deception planners have always understood this principle intuitively. While discussing a deception operation which took place shortly after Anzio in the Italian campaign, Sir David Hunt observed almost as an aside (48),

This shows, incidentally, one of the reasons why we decided against leading with the left handed punch from Anzio: that the enemy reserves were in that neighborhood. It also shows the advantage of the deception plan in that an attack in strength on the Rapido front would be exactly what the enemy would expect as the first move in an attack even if the main move was to be a seaborne landing or eruption from the bridgehead. After all, we had done exactly the same at the time of the Anzio landing in January. Accordingly he might be expected to be slow to put in his reserves against it until we had shown our hand." (Emphasis added)

Deferring the riskier portions of a deception may also have the advantage that even if the deception plan is compromised, the opponent will have insufficient time to recover and take appropriate action.