Page:CIAdeceptionMaximsFactFolklore 1980.pdf/37

C00036554 Axelrod (1) furnishes other examples of this same type; employment of Ultra in World war II, the Syrian decision to withhold use of its new SAM air defense despite losses until the "opportune" time in the 1973 war and the use of double agents by Britain in connection with the Normandy deception. He also presents a simple yet useful mathematical model to gain quantitative insight into the problem. A concise technical statement of this model and solution is provided in Figure 5. The essence of the problem examined by the model is this: should a given opportunity be taken and an immediate gain achieved even though the asset may subsequently be valueless, or should the asset be saved in expectation of better gains to come? If the asset is saved rather than used, there is a cost of maintenance and risk of compromise. The optimal solution to this problem takes the form: if the value of the opportunity exceeds a threshold that can be calculated, in principle, use the asset, otherwise save it. The optimal threshold is a function of the distribution of opportunities, risks of compromise, and costs of maintenance. Ceteris Paribus, the optimal threshold,