Page:CIAdeceptionMaximsFactFolklore 1980.pdf/34

C00036554 The value of information (and/or costs of misinformation) is a composite function of the a priori probabilities of chance events in the decision tree and the utility or value attached to these outcomes — a relation that is not captured by the usual information measures.

In contrast to A-deception, M-deception (or misdirection) reduces uncertainty — after Whaley, "...the ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive, and wrong" (emphasis in original). In the attack/defense game, M-deception would involve convincing the victim to defend one site, then attack the other. To the extent this can be achieved, the value of the game also approaches unity.

Deception schemes used in practice are typically composites of the two variants, usually with one or the other type dominant. Such was the case at Normandy, for example. The multiple attack location threats in the initial stages are evidence of A-deception. In the end phases, however, Normandy fas predominently an M-deception. We know of no data that directly address the relative efficacy of these types, though there are normative arguments in favor of M-deception (4). Deception professionals seem to prefer M-deception,